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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual, 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and PHILLIPS 





B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20060856-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
Appellants, WILLIAM T. JACOB, COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., and 
PHILLIPS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., appeal from the district court's 
grant of the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary 
Judgment, motions for attorney fees and related motion to strike portions of affidavits; 
and from the denial of Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
ISSUE 1: Did the district court err in concluding that Defendants' internet 
posting, mailing and hand-delivering an "Urgent Election Notice" to the homes of 
American Fork City citizens, for the purpose of preserving a business relationship and 
friendship, occurred in the "process of government" as defined by Utah Code Ann. §78-
58-101, etseq ("the Act" or "the anti-SLAPP1 Act")? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a question of statutory interpretation that is 
reviewed for correctness, "granting no deference to the district court's decision." Carter 
v. Univ. of Utah Med. Or., 2006 UT 78, «(j8. 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS BRETT BEZZANT AND NEWTAH, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("JP 
Oppos.") (R1648) and Plaintiffs' MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT'S RULINGS ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM MOTION TO RECONSIDER ("Motion to 
Reconsider") R2603. 
ISSUE 2: Did the district court err in awarding Defendants' their attorneys fees 
under the Act and under 42 U.S.C. §1983, concluding that the action "was commenced or 
continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a 
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"; and 
were Plaintiffs denied due process of law when the district court concluded affidavits 
submitted on this issue were inadmissible, and thereby refused to allow Plaintiffs to 
present evidence of a substantial basis in fact and law and their good faith in filing the 
lawsuit? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue involves questions of law and questions 
1
 SLAPP is an acronym for "Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation." 
2 
of fact. Questions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness, 
"granting no deference to the district court's decision." Carter v. Univ. of Utah Med. 
Ctr., 2006 UT 78, [^8. Because the factual determinations were made pursuant to a 
judgment on the pleadings, this Court must accept Plaintiffs' factual allegations and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom as true and in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. In re 
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997). Whether evidence is admissible is a 
question of law that can be reviewed for abuse of discretion or for correctness, 
"incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for subsidiary factual 
determinations." D.A. v. State (In the Interest ofW.A.), 63 P.3d 607, 611 (Utah 2002) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
PRESERVATION: The issue of attorney fees was heavily litigated and thus 
preserved in several of the pleadings below. See, e.g., R2161, 2167, 2463. 
ISSUE 3: Did the district court err in granting Defendants' motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, and thereby concluding that the statements at 
issue are not defamatory per se and that Plaintiffs' claims for defamation and false light 
lack merit? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[F]or purposes of appellate review, the standard for 
reviewing a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings is the same, since 
motions for either kind of judgment can be granted only as a matter of law. ... [A] court 
must accept the material allegations of the [nonmoving party's pleadings] as true, ... and 
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that [the nonmoving 
party] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Similarly, reviewing a grant of 
3 
summary judgment under rule 56, an appellate court may reverse the trial court only if 
'there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)." In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 
353 (Utah 1997). "[W]hen an appellate court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, while the district court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v. 
Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^ 8 (some citations and quotations omitted). Whether a statement 
is defamatory is a question of law that is also reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs' JP Oppos. R1648. 
ISSUE 4: Is the anti-SLAPP Act unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this 
case under the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a statute is constitutional as applied to the 
facts of a specific case is a question of law. Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 
1148, 1151 (Utah 2002). A statute is presumed constitutional such that any reasonable 
doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id. 
PRESERVATION: Plaintiffs raise this state constitutional law claim for the first 
time on appeal under the interests of justice and the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on October 26, 2000. R6. The parties stipulated to 
Plaintiffs filing an Amended Complaint (R280) on June 10, 2002. R293. The Amended 
Complaint named current Defendants as well as American Fork City and various 
individuals who were mostly public officials in that municipality. R280. Plaintiffs' 
claims included several violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983, defamation, and false light. Id. 
In Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim (R385) filed July 18, 2002, they raised 
their claims and defenses under Utah Code Ann. §78-58-101, etseq. (2001), also known 
as the Citizen Participation in Government Act or anti-SLAPP Act (Addendum A), 
which was enacted in April 2001, six months after the action was commenced. 
Defendants then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment 
on July 31, 2002, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed under the anti-
SLAPP Act and generally that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for defamation or false 
light. R426. Under the provisions of the anti-SLAPP Act, Defendants' Motion was 
treated as one for judgment on the pleadings and resulted in a mandatory stay on 
discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-104. 
In the meantime, the matter was removed to federal court on August 19, 2002, 
then returned to the state district court in or about August 2003. R523, 531, 996. 
Notwithstanding the federal court's refusal to award Defendants attorney fees based on 
its finding that Plaintiffs' acted in good faith (R1086), Defendants relitigated the issue in 
the district court and won. R1903. 
On April 2, 2004, the district court issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment (R1825, 1855; 
5 
Addendum B), wherein it concluded that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed under 
the anti-SLAPP Act, After the matter was heavily litigated over a period of several 
months, the court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims lacked any merit and awarded 
Defendants attorney fees and costs under the statute, which fees exceeded $200,000. 
R1897, 1900, 1903, 2637, 2833, 2987, 2992, 3000, 3038, 3045; Addendum C. 
On October 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider Court's Rulings on 
Summary Judgment and/or Judgment on the Pleadings, wherein Plaintiffs pointed out that 
Defendants' defamatory statements did not occur "in the process of government" as 
defined by the Act. R2603, 2630. The district court denied this motion on January 12, 
2006. R2828. Via stipulation, all orders and judgments were adjudged final under Rule 
54(b) on August 23, 2006 (R3058) and Plaintiffs timely filed a Notice of Appeal on 
September 13, 2006. R3068. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
This case is about a private citizen, William T. (Bill) Jacob, who was publicly 
ridiculed and falsely accused of lying and negative campaigning. When Jacob sought 
redress of his grievances in good faith, he was not only denied access to the courts, but he 
was severely sanctioned just for seeking a judicial remedy that has existed at common 
law even prior to statehood. 
To summarize the material facts that are provided in greater detail below, in the 
context of a pending municipal election, an American Fork City newspaper published a 
flyer containing false statements about Jacob, a private individual. Jacob sued for 
6 
defamation and the newspaper counterclaimed under the recently enacted anti-SLAPP 
Act, claiming that the purpose of the lawsuit was to punish the newspaper for exercising 
its First Amendment rights. After substantial analysis of conflicting legal authority, the 
district court dismissed Jacob's claims and ordered him to pay over $200,000 in attorney 
fees and costs. The district court never found that Jacob's claims were frivolous. Rather, 
it concluded that the statements in the newspaper flyer were not defamatory. 
While the facts in this case are construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs 
{see, Issues and Standards of Review, supra), the issues involve primarily questions of 
law. Because Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed under the recently enacted anti-SLAPP 
Act, some are also important questions of statutory interpretation and thus questions of 
first impression. 
Relevant Facts 
Plaintiff, William T. (Bill) Jacob ("Jacob") is a private person and business owner 
in American Fork City ("AFC"), Utah, whose reputation for integrity, honesty, and sound 
judgment is essential to the success of his business. R280:5. Jacob is a shareholder and 
Chief Operating Officer of Plaintiffs Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI") and Phillips 
Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("PMC"). Id. (Plaintiffs will be collectively referred to 
herein either as "Plaintiffs" or "Jacob"). 
In 1993, Jacob established a confidential relationship with Newtah, the owner of 
the American Fork newspaper, Citizen New Utah, and Brett Bezzant, Newtah's publisher, 
whereby Jacob agreed to provide information about current events of interest to AFC 
citizens in exchange for Defendants protecting Jacob's anonymity. Id. at 11; R1528 
7 
(Defendants who are parties to this appeal will be collectively referred to herein either as 
"Defendants" or "Bezzant"). This agreement was reaffirmed in 1997 when Bezzant 
agreed not to reveal Jacob as the source of such information. Id. at 12. 
In 1997, Jacob learned that AFC public officials were conducting closed meetings 
in violation of the Open Meetings Law, during which they covertly planned the purchase 
and development of land contrary to an already existing Strategic Plan that had been 
publicly discussed and adopted five years prior in 1992. R280:12-13, 20. When Jacob 
attempted to express his concerns as a private citizen about the closed meetings during a 
1997 city council meeting, a city employee told him to "shut up, sit down, and quit 
talking." Id. at 19. Subsequently during a press conference held in July 1997, an AFC 
public official falsely accused Jacob of "grilling" AFC council members without factual 
basis. Id. at 21-2. Through a series of subsequent events involving threats, intimidation, 
and confrontation perpetrated by AFC public officials, hostility toward and retaliation 
against Jacob and other private citizens who questioned the propriety of public officials' 
activities continued to escalate. Id. 19-25. 
Because of increasing threats, intimidation, and the unlawful use of police force, 
by the fall of 1997 Jacob and his wife feared for their safety such that, among other 
things, they avoided traveling alone at night. R280:26-7; see also, R280:20-9. When 
Jacob's wife expressed these fears during an October 1997 city council meeting, other 
private citizens in attendance responded with an enthusiastic round of applause, 
indicating that Jacob and his wife were not the only citizens who felt intimidated and 
threatened. Id. at 28. 
8 
Notwithstanding these fears, Jacob continued his efforts to keep AFC citizens 
informed. Id. at 28, 30-1, 33-7. In retaliation, in January 1998 the mayor of AFC 
threatened Jacob that his or his daughter's home might be burglarized and a subsequent 
police investigation might reveal something that Jacob wanted to "keep quiet," 
suggesting that illegal drugs, pornography, or other contraband would be planted. Id. at 
30-1. In November 2000 and consistent with the constant harassment, Jacob received a 
document via mail entitled, "Certificate of Upgrade to Complete Asshole" that was 
signed by "Citizens Who Know." Id. at 35. 
In 1992, AFC adopted Ordinance Nos. 92-05-20 and 92-05-21, which define 
"exempt" AFC employees as all elected officials, all appointed officials, the City 
Administrator, the Chief of Police, attorneys serving as legal counsel, consultants 
rendering professional services, part-time employees working thirty hours per week or 
less, and all volunteer personnel serving with or without pay. R280:10. Ordinance No. 
92-05-21 prohibits any such exempt employee from seeking or holding public office in 
AFC. M a t 11. 
In 1999, Ricky Storrs and Tom Hunter announced their intent to seek public office 
in AFC. R280:36. Jacob contends that both were exempt employees under the foregoing 
city ordinances. Storrs worked part-time for AFC as an EMT, while Hunter was 
employed as AFC's Employee Benefit Consultant. Id. Jacob was not the only concerned 
private citizen. Hunter's and Storrs' apparent conflicts of interest were the topic of 
articles published by The Deseret News and the Provo Daily Herald. Id. AFC citizens 
also questioned Hunter directly about his conflict during a "Meet the Candidate Night" in 
9 
September 1999. Id. at 38. 
To better inform the public about this issue and pursuant to the existing 
confidentiality agreement between Bezzant and Jacob, on October 27, 1999, Bezzant 
distributed an anonymous "Nonpartisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" ("NPCG 
Bulletin") (Addendum D; R2740) that questioned the propriety of Hunters' and Storrs' 
seeking and holding public office in violation of AFC ordinances. R280:38-9. Bezzant 
saw the NPCG Bulletin and knew of its content before it was distributed. R1528. 
Bezzant also admits that he could have refused to distribute the NPCG Bulletin. R1527. 
Immediately upon distribution of the NPCG Bulletin, Hunter contacted Bezzant 
and threatened to sue him and Newtah, and to discontinue advertising in the Citizen 
unless Bezzant published a retraction prepared by Hunter. Id. at 39-40. Contrary to their 
existing confidentiality agreement, Bezzant disclosed Jacob's name to Hunter as the 
person who paid for the distribution of the NPCG Bulletin. Id. Hunter then contacted 
Jacob and threatened to sue him for defamation if he did not have Bezzant publish the 
prepared retraction. Id. R1457 (December 9, 1999 Letter from Brett Bezzant to William 
T. Jacob, Addendum G). Hunter's attorney reiterated these threats in a letter sent to 
Jacob during this same time period. Id. at 40. Jacob ignored Hunter's threats because he 
believed AFC citizens should be informed about the candidates and their conflicts of 
interest. 
However, Bezzant immediately published an "Urgent Election Notice" and 
"Apology" ("Notice") (Addendum E; R2609-10) that disclosed Jacob's name ("William 
T. (Bill) Jacob") and referred to the NPCG Bulletin as "Mr. Jacob's flyer," falsely 
10 
identified him as the author of the NPCG Bulletin, falsely accused him of feeding the 
public false and misleading information, and described the Bulletin attributed to him as a 
"classic" example of "negative campaigning intended to hurt one candidate in order to 
favor another." Id. The Notice was published with the express approval of candidates 
Hunter and Storrs. R1529-30 (Response to Requests for Admission Nos. 6, 7, 12, 13). 
The Notice was mailed and hand delivered to the residents of American Fork, and 
published on the Citizen World Wide website. Addendum B at 9. The content of the 
Notice is as follows: 
New Utah! Offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for campaign flyer 
Urgent Election Notice 
To: All American Fork Residents 
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council Candidate Tom 
Hunter 
The Oct. 27 issue of the American Fork Citizen New Utah! and New Utah! 
Shopper carried a political advertisement that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and 
produced by William T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan 
Citizens Group." 
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for distributing 
this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe 
is false and misleading information regarding his service to American Fork City. 
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by American Fork City. Neither 
has he received any employee compensation nor any other employee benefit from 
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own Hunter & Associates 
Insurance and his firm was selected in 1997 to act as an independent insurance 
broker on the employee benefits package for American Fork City. His firm 
provides this same kind of service for many other employers. 
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Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City is a potential conflict 
of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly 
identifying the potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting on 
any issue that involves his pre-existing interest in the employee benefits package. 
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is, to the best of our 
knowledge, a qualified and eligible city council candidate and his candidacy has 
not, in any way, violated the policies or procedures of American Fork City. 
We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs 
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick Storrs, citing a city 
personnel ordinance that does not even apply to Mr. Storr's part-time volunteer 
employment as a city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city councilman 
and as an incumbent candidate have been well established in at least two other 
elections. We apologize to Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that 
would bring his candidacy into question. 
Comments on the flyer 
Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group. Since American 
Fork no longer has political parties, there is no such thing as a "nonpartisan" 
group. Unfortunately, this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning 
intended to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hurts the 
entire process. Again, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for 
distributing this misinformation. 
After publication of the foregoing, AFC Mayor Ted Barratt publicly denounced 
the authors of the NPCG Bulletin attributed to Jacob as "scum-feeders" and 
"bottomfeeders." R280:40. Jacob commenced this lawsuit, the procedural history of 
which is outlined in the Statement of the Case, supra. 
Additional material facts will be cited herein as warranted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to these facts. Bezzant's conduct did not 
occur in the "process of government." Bezzant admits he published the Notice to 
12 
preserve his friendship and business relationships with Hunter and Storrs and that he did 
not intend to influence the decisions of the legislative and executive branches of 
government, as required by the Act's plain language. 
There is also no evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, that Jacob's purpose 
in filing the lawsuit in this case was motivated by bad faith or by a desire to chill 
Bezzant's right to participate in the process of government. 
The district court erred in awarding Bezzant attorney's fees based on its 
conclusions that Jacob's claims lack legal and factual merit. The district court engaged in 
a detailed legal analysis of seemingly conflicting authority when it evaluated Jacob's 
claims, which fact standing alone demonstrates their merit. The district court also failed 
to construe the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob and denied him due process of law 
when it refused to permit Jacob to produce evidence of his good faith in bringing suit, 
particularly when the basis for Bezzant's claim for attorney's fees was Jacob's purported 
bad faith. 
Bezzant is equitably estopped from seeking attorney fees because he was unable to 
provide any response to Jacob's specific request for information relative to Bezzant's 
defense that Jacob's claims were filed in bad faith. Moreover, because a federal court has 
already denied Bezzant's request for attorney's fees based on a finding of good faith, the 
law of the case doctrine precludes the district court's subsequent inconsistent order. 
The district court erred in concluding that the statements at issue are not 
defamatory and did not cast Jacob in a false light. Not only did Jacob establish a prima 
facie case for defamation and false light, the court failed to construe the facts in a light 
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most favorable to Jacob. Also, because the statements accused Jacob of deliberately 
misleading the public in an effort to promote negative campaigning and identified him 
contrary to his wishes while holding him out as an object of public contempt and ridicule, 
the statements are defamatory per se. 
Finally, application of the anti-SLAPP Act to these facts violates the Open Courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THESE FACTS. 
The district court found that Jacob's claims were filed "for the purpose of chilling 
Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or interfering with Bezzant's proper 
participation in the process of government. ... Jacob intended to use this litigation as a 
means of punishing Bezzant for Bezzant's publication of the political speech contained in 
the election notice." Addendum B at 14. These findings and conclusions are incorrect 
for three reasons. First, Bezzant's publication was not a "proper participation in the 
process of government" as defined by the Act. Second, there is no evidence that Jacob 
filed his claims to chill Bezzant's "proper participating in the process of government." 
Finally, the district court failed to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Jacob. Accordingly, the Act does not apply to these facts.2 
2
 Although the district court denied Jacob's Motion to Reconsider on the ground that the 
motion was procedurally improper, the court still addressed the question of whether 
Defendants' publication occurred in the process of government and found that it did. 
R2828 (Addendum I). The district court's analysis is flawed. A motion to reconsider 
should be considered and construed according to its substance. Bonneville Billing & 
Collection v. Torres, 15 P.3d 112, 113 (Utah App. 2000). A court should carefully 
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A. Defendants Were Not Participating in the Process of Government When 
They Published the Notice. 
The anti-SLAPP Act only applies to an action if its "primary purpose ... is to 
prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of 
government." Utah Code Ann. §78-58-104(2). Section 78-58-102(5) defines "process of 
government" as "the means and mechanisms by which the legislative and executive 
branches of government make decisions, and the activities leading up to the decisions, 
including the exercise by a citizen of the right to influence those decisions under the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." See Addendum A. Even if Defendants' 
statements are "political speech" as the district court concluded they were (Addendum B 
at 14), political speech has no nexus to the decision-making mechanisms of the legislative 
and executive branches of government. 
When construing statutes, this Court "assumes that each term included in the 
[statute] was used advisedly." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2004). 
A court must look to a statute's plain language to determine the intent and purpose of the 
legislature, and must not go beyond that plain language unless it is ambiguous. State v. 
McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, f6, 51 P.3d 729. This Court has already concluded that 
there is no ambiguity in the limiting provisions of the anti-SLAPP Act. Anderson v. 
Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 336 (Utah 2005). The legislature's advised use of the plain 
of such a motion and correct any errors raised therein. Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 
1205, 1208 (Utah App. 1991). The substance of Jacob's motion in this case raised errors 
of law based on the court's incorrect application of the controlling statute. Therefore, the 
district court erred in denying Jacob's motion to reconsider because it raised legal errors 
of statutory interpretation that the district court should have corrected. 
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language limiting the Act's application to the decision making mechanisms of the 
legislative and executive branches of government was intended to limit the Act's scope 
accordingly. 
Thus the Act does not apply when, as here, a newspaper, in admitted response to 
threats of a lawsuit and lost advertising, posts on its website and hand-delivers to citizens 
an "Urgent Election Notice" and "apology." These facts evidence no intent to influence 
the decisions of the legislative and executive branches of government. Notably, nor have 
the Defendants so claimed. 
Under the plain language of the Act, Bezzant's conduct is not protected. 
B. The "Urgent Election Notice" Was Hand Delivered to and Intended for 
the Citizens of American Fork and had No Nexus to the Decision 
Making Mechanisms of Government. 
Even the district court initially concluded that Bezzant's conduct did not qualify 
for the Act's protection, if inadvertently. In its first ruling before the statutory definition 
of "process of government" was raised, the district court found, "Bezzant's publication of 
the election notice was primarily directed to the citizens of American Fork who had a 
direct interest in the upcoming election." Addendum B at 16-17. There was no finding 
that the Notice was intended to influence decisions of the legislative and executive 
branches of government and there was not one iota of evidence to suggest otherwise. 
Later when Jacob pointed out that such conduct was not directed to the decision 
making mechanisms of any branch of government and thus the Act did not apply, the 
district court created its own facts and found that Bezzant's Notice was directed "to those 
in the city's executive and legislative positions who had the power to disqualify the 
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candidates." R2545 at 5; Addendum F. There is no factual support for this 
subsequently crafted finding. Moreover, the district court's inconsistent and creative 
findings evidence its failure, indeed its refusal, to construe the facts in a light most 
favorable to Jacob. 
When evaluating Bezzant's true intent, nothing is as persuasive as his own 
admissions. Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim admits the following: 
Plaintiffs' lawsuit is without merit and is not brought or asserted in good faith, but 
instead is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) filed to chill 
and discourage Defendants' publication of information and commentary on issues 
of public interest relating to the American Fork City Council election, and in 
particular, to punish Defendants for publishing information and commentary 
critical of the Bulletin prepared by plaintiff. (Thirty-Second Defense). 
16. The Editorial is personally addressed from Bezzant to "All American Fork 
Residents. 
17. The Editorial disputes the allegations contained in Jacob's Bulletin 
concerning the eligibility of Hunter and Storrs to run for the American Fork 
City Council and apologizes to readers for distributing the Bulletin without 
giving the candidates an opportunity to respond before the election. 
20. In distributing the Editorial at his own expense, it was Bezzant's intent to 
publicly communicate the information he received from Hunter and Storrs 
disputing the allegations made about them in the Bulletin; to disseminate such 
information prior to the municipal election so that the residents of American 
Fork City could be more fully informed on the matter before they cast their 
votes; to comment upon the Bulletin and its effect on the political process; to 
apologize for distributing the Bulletin without giving Hunter and Storrs an 
opportunity to respond prior to the election; to participate in the process of 
American fork City government by communicating to voters information and 
commentary relevant to the municipal election; and to engage in activity that is 
at the core of the First Amendment - political speech and commentary. 
R385 (emphasis added). 
A letter Bezzant wrote to Plaintiff Jacob is even more helpful: 
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... in fairness to the two candidates mentioned in your advertisement, I corrected 
what was lacking in your preprinted flyer ... I discussed with ... our managing 
editor, the possibility of publishing some disclaimer in the newspaper. ... 
Wednesday morning [October 27, 1999] I received an angry message from Tom 
Hunter. He wanted to know who paid for the flyer and threatened to sue 
whomever thait was as well as the newspaper. He also threatened to cancel his 
business advertising with the newspaper. He was, understandably, upset... 
In my conversation with Tom Hunter ... I ... offered to deliver my own response 
prior to the election. I asked him to write down what he would like me to publish 
In retrospect, my response was partly an emotional one. I was, in effect, 
defending a friend whose character had been maligned. Tom Hunter is not only a 
valued business client of the newspaper, he is also my insurance agent and friend. 
R1457 (Addendum G). 
The Notice was widely published via mailing, door-to-door delivery, and on a web 
site that is accessible from anywhere in the world. No statements contained therein were 
personally or generally directed to members of the executive or legislative branches of 
government and, according to Bezzant's own admissions, the publications were not 
intended to influence the decisions of those branches but were in defense of a friend. The 
Notice was published to the citizens of AFC. Addendum E. Its title unambiguously and 
publicly communicates an "apology" to Hunter and Storrs for the previous NPCG 
Bulletin. Id. Bezzant's publications were designed to sooth the ruffled feathers of two 
candidates who were in reality not qualified to run for public office and who wrote it or 
approved of it prior to distribution. Rl 529-30. 
Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob, Bezzant was not 
participating in the process of government when he publicly accused Jacob of distributing 
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false and misleading information and of negative campaigning. Moreover, there is no 
fact in this case to suggest that Bezzant's publications were intended to petition or to 
otherwise influence the decisions of the executive or legislative branches. The district 
court's conclusion that the anti-SLAPP Act applied to these facts is incorrect as a matter 
of law. 
C. Anti-SLAPP Statutes Are Wisely Limited to Protecting Citizens' Rights 
to Petition Government. 
While the foregoing demonstrates that Bezzant's Notice does not qualify for the 
anti-SLAPP statute's protection, a comparison to similar legislation in other states sheds 
additional light on the Act's purpose and legislative intent. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court preemptively recognized the problem with 
overreaching and unconstitutional application of proposed anti-SLAPP legislation. 
Accordingly, the court advised the New Hampshire legislature that such proposed 
legislation would violate the state constitution. Opinion of the Justices, 138 N.H. 445, 
641 A.2d 1012, 1994 N.H. LEXIS 50 (declining to address the constitutionality of the 
proposed legislation under the federal constitution because the fact that the proposed bill 
would deprive litigants of their state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases was 
dispositive). See also, Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992) 
("Utah's open courts provision guarantees a person access to the courts 'for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation.' Utah Const. Art. I, §11.")- With these 
same concerns in mind, other states that have enacted anti-SLAPP legislation have been 
careful to limit its application. 
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In New York for example, anti-SLAPP legislation is limited to actions "brought 
by a public applicant or permittee [or a developer], and is materially related to any efforts 
of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application 
or permission." NY CLS Civ. R. §76-a (2005). See also, Long Island Ass 'n for Aids 
Care v. Greene, 269 AD2d 430, 702 NYS2d 914 (2000) (holding anti-SLAPP did not 
apply because claims asserted against defendant were not materially related to any efforts 
by her to report on, comment on, challenge, or oppose application by plaintiff for permit, 
license, or other authorization from public body); Guerrero v. Carva, 779 NYS2d 12 
(App Div, 1st Dept, 2004) (explaining that anti-SLAPP did not apply where defamatory 
flyer distributed by tenants regarding a landlord and developer did not relate to any 
petition or other permit-related proceeding). 
Strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPS, "are typically filed by 
real estate developers against citizens' groups or individuals who have voiced their 
opposition to a planned development." Scanlon v. McHugh, 4 Mass. L. Rep. 334, 1995 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 228, n. 6 (noting that "right to petition" is defined by the Mass. Act 
as "any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made 
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to 
encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial body 
or any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public 
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participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or any other statement falling 
within constitutional protection of the right to petition government"). 
Because it includes rights to petition the judiciary, the Massachusetts act applies 
more broadly than the Utah language limiting the "process of government" only to the 
executive and legislative branches of government. A moving party in Massachusetts 
must also establish that claims against him are based upon the exercise of his right to 
petition "under the constitution of the United States or of the Commonwealth [of 
Massachusetts]." Id. (holding that although the defendant's defamatory statements 
constituted conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute because it did involve the right to 
petition regarding a proposed real estate development, the plaintiff had made the requisite 
showing that the statements were false and that he had suffered actual injury in the form 
of mental suffering); See also, Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 
(involving a developer suing private citizens for their opposition to development). 
The language in Georgia's anti-SLAPP legislation is similarly restrictive. The 
Georgia act applies only to "any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made 
before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official 
proceeding authorized by law, or any written or oral statements, writing, or petition made 
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law." See, Georgia 
Community Support & Solutions, Inc. v. Berryhill, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 840, n. 3 ("The 
anti-SLAPP statute does not encompass all statements that touch upon matters of public 
concern"). 
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Similar to the anti-SLAPP acts in New York, Massachusetts, and Georgia,3 the 
Utah statute was crafted to apply to a narrow range of conduct: that occurring in the 
process of government as defined by the Act. This limitation on the type of conduct 
subject to an anti-SLAPP claim is well reasoned and specifically designed to create 
statutory protection for private citizens against abusive lawsuits filed by large private 
interests. See, Salvo v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc., 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 724 
(explaining that SLAPP suits are "generally meritless suits brought by large private 
3
 In contrast to New York, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Utah, California's anti-
SLAPP act is both drafted and construed more broadly to encompass matters of "public 
interest," which accounts for the substantial volume of litigation and widely divergent 
rulings that have been generated since its enactment in the early 1990fs. See e.g., Du 
Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 110 Cal. App. 4th 107, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 501, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1002. However, even in California, courts have 
narrowly construed what constitutes a matter of "public interest," concluding that 
defamatory statements directed at an individual, even in the context of a public issue, are 
not necessarily issues of public interest. Id. at 117 (explaining that "a union's allegedly 
defamatory statements were not made in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest because they concerned the supervision of a staff of eight by an individual 
who had previously received no attention or media coverage, and the only people directly 
involved in and affected by the situation were the supervisor and his eight supervisees. . . 
. [T]he mere publication (in a newsletter, for example, or on a Web site) should not turn 
otherwise private information (e.g., job termination) into a matter of public interest"); see 
also, O'Meara v. Palomar-Pomerado Health System, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (Cal. App. 
2005) (holding that anti-SLAPP did not apply to doctor's action against defendant 
because, among other reasons, defendant's conduct of defaming the doctor in a peer 
review hearing "did not involve an exercise of their free speech or petition rights"). 
Further, even in California a prima facie showing of defamation defeats a SLAPP 
counterclaim. Lafayette, Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
46 (App. 1 Dist. 1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, rehearing denied, review denied, cert, 
denied, 519 U.S. 809; see also, e.g., Fleishman v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383 
(App. 2 Dist. 2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 350 (motion to strike under anti-SLAPP must be 
denied if plaintiff alleges prima facie case which, if believed by trier of fact, will result in 
judgment for the plaintiff); Wang v. Hartunian, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, (App. 2 Dist. 2003) 
111 Cal. App. 4th 744 (same). 
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interests to deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to 
punish them for doing so") (citation omitted). Anti-SLAPPs were never intended to 
banish private citizens from the courts and punish them for seeking a judicial remedy for 
very public wrongs, such as occurred here. 
Further, the misuse of anti-SLAPP legislation against private citizens, as in this 
case, has been strongly criticized in a federal forum as "standing] the purpose of the 
legislation on its head." Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. The Village of New 
Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 360 (US So. Dist. NY 2000) ("The new anti-SLAPP law 
creates a new right of action for victims of SLAPP suits. It places new restrictions on the 
ability of public applicants to seek redress from courts.. . . As such, the new anti-SLAPP 
law is in derogation of the common law. It is well established that statutes in derogation 
of the common law are to be construed narrowly") (citations omitted). 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, while recognizing the potential for 
abuse and unconstitutional application if anti-SLAPP legislation is not narrowly confined 
to infringements upon the right to petition government, other states have either 
preemptively discouraged the legislation or have restricted its application to its narrow 
purpose: precluding large private interest plaintiffs from bringing meritless lawsuits to 
harass and intimidate private citizens. It was never intended to enable a large private 
interest to publish defamatory statements about a private citizen, then to punish that 
citizen for seeking a remedy from the court as has occurred in the present case. 
D. There is No Evidence, Clear and Convincing or Otherwise, that Jacob's 
Purpose in Bringing Suit was to Chill Bezzanf s Participation in the 
Process of Government. 
23 
For the district court to conclude that Jacob's Complaint was a SLAPP action, it 
had to find, while construing all of the facts and reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to Jacob, there was still clear and convincing evidence that Jacob filed suit to 
interfere with or chill Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-58-104(2); Anderson v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005). 
The district court was unable to point to any fact suggesting Jacob's purpose in 
filing suit was improper. Rather, the court concluded, "The lengthy procedural history ... 
supports the proposition that Jacob intended to use this litigation as a means of punishing 
Bezzant for Bezzanf s publication of the political speech contained in the election 
notice." Addendum B at 14. However, a "proposition" based on a vaguely referenced 
procedural history is not clear and convincing evidence of an improper purpose. 
Moreover, the district court's language again demonstrates a failure to construe the facts 
in Jacob's favor, which is required on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
SLAPP suits are fundamentally aimed at harming the First Amendment right of 
citizens to petition government. Therefore, the hallmark of a SLAPP suit is one that 
lacks any merit and is brought for the sole purpose of obtaining an economic advantage 
over a citizen party by increasing his litigation costs to the extent that his case becomes 
weakened or abandoned. eCash Technologies\ Inc. v. Guagliardo, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1138 
(CD. Cal. 2001); Wilcox v. Superior Court (App. 2 Dist. 1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 809) 
(explaining that SLAPP suits are brought by large private interests to deter citizens from 
exercising their First Amendment rights, or to punish them for doing so). A SLAPP suit 
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is not a legitimate dispute of facts and law like this case is, the outcome of which is 
contingent upon judicial interpretation of conflicting authority. 
Thus anti-SLAPP statutes only apply when the actual objective of the suit is to 
interfere with the defendant's First Amendment rights, primarily the right to petition 
government. Foothills Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4 688 (App. 4 
Dist. 1998), rehearing denied, review denied, cert, denied, 525 U.S. 1106; see also, 
Dixon v. Superior Court (App. 4 Dist. 1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 733 (explaining that 
plaintiffs who bring SLAPP suits do not intend to win, but do so to cause delay and 
distraction, and to punish citizen activists by causing them to incur litigation costs for 
exercising their right to speak and petition government for redress of grievances). 
Indeed, the purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation is to encourage private citizens to 
participate in government and to prevent the chilling of such participation through the 
abuse of judicial process. People ex re. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit 
Consultants, Inc., App. 2 Dist. 2000) 86 Cal. App. 4th 280; see also, Dixon v. Superior 
Court (App. 4 Dist. 1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 733 (explaining that plaintiffs who bring 
SLAPP suits do not intend to win, but rather intend to delay and create a distraction, and 
to punish activists for exercising their right to petition government by causing them to 
incur litigation costs). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Bezzant's conduct cannot be construed as "proper 
participation in the process of government," there are no facts to support an inference that 
Jacob's primary motivation in bringing suit was to interfere with or chill any of Bezzant's 
rights. The facts compel the opposite conclusion. The most obvious such fact is that the 
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Complaint was filed a year after the election of Bezzant's friend and business associate to 
the AFC City Council. 
The anti-SLAPP required the district court to find Jacob never believed his claims 
had any merit prior to concluding the Act applied. There are no facts to suggest that 
Jacob lacked an honest belief that his claims were meritorious, even if not construed in a 
light most favorable to Jacob. There is no dispute that Bezzant published the Notices in 
this case. There is no dispute that the Notices named Jacob contrary to his express 
wishes. There is no dispute that the Notices accused Jacob of intentionally publishing 
false information and of "classic" negative campaigning, and thereby held him out as an 
object of public ridicule, contempt and hatred. Bezzant's pleadings are devoid of any fact 
suggesting Jacob filed his claims in bad faith or that he lacked a reasonable belief in their 
merits. The district court made no finding that Jacob believed his claims lacked merit. 
Further, Jacob's prior attorney, Brent Stephens, submitted specific requests for 
discovery giving Bezzant an opportunity to support his bare allegation in his first Answer 
that Jacob's claims were brought in bad faith and were frivolous. R1544. In response, 
Bezzant stated only a general belief but was unable to cite any facts suggesting bad faith, 
and could only reserve the right to supplement his response as additional facts were 
obtained in discovery. R1540. No supplementation ever occurred. Bezzant's inability to 
cite a single fact evidencing Jacob's alleged bad faith hardly supports a finding that 
Jacob's claims were brought primarily to interfere with or chill Bezzant's rights. 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the district court's conclusion that the 
anti-SLAPP Act applies in this case is incorrect. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS' GOOD FAITH 
EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A JUDICIAL REMEDY BY AWARDING 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The district court awarded Bezzant his attorney fees on two separate occasions. 
First, Bezzant was awarded fees for litigating Jacob's claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
Addendum B at 23. Later, Bezzant was awarded fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-58-105. Both provisions require a showing of bad faith before imposition of the 
attorney fees sanction can be justified. 
A. The District Court Erred in Awarding Fees Under the anti-SLAPP Act Because 
Jacob's Claims Have Both Legal and Factual Merit. 
Failing to construe the facts in a light most favorable to Jacob and only after much 
briefing and analysis, the district court concluded that Jacob's claims lacked factual and 
legal merit because (1) Bezzant's Notice did not convey a defamatory meaning as a 
matter of law; (2) the Notice was protected by Utah's public interest privilege;4 (3) the 
statements in the Notice were opinion and not verifiable statements of fact; (4) the 
statements were not defamatory per se and Jacob failed to plead special damages; (5) 
Jacob's claims "were so deficient that they did not even pass the 'relatively low' 
threshold for surviving a motion for summary judgment." Addendum F at 10. The 
court also concluded that Jacob's claims were "not supported by a substantial argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id. 
4
 Notably, in concluding that the statements were privileged, the district court cited 
Seegmiller, infra, which it previously determined this Court had implicitly overruled. 
Addendum B at 16. 
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To justify an award of attorney fees, Utah Code Ann. §78-58-105 requires a 
showing "that the action involving public participation in the process of government was 
commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be 
supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law." This language is almost identical to that provided in Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for similarly harsh sanctions only when "the 
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are [not] warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law 
or the establishment of new law." However, while Rule 11 imposes an equitable notice 
requirement and sanctions counsel, the attorney fees provision in the anti-SLAPP Act 
provides no notice requirement and sanctions the party. 
An award of attorney's fees is generally recognized as a harsh and punitive 
sanction for demonstrable bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. This Court 
recently instructed, "We remind trial courts that the reason for awarding attorney fees 
based on bad faith is to punish the wrongdoer, and not compensate the victim, and that 
fees should therefore be awarded only upon specific evidence of bad faith." Still 
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005) (holding that "lack of 
legal merit is insufficient for an attorney fee award under [§78-27-56]") (citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted). 
A finding of bad faith is required under the anti-SLAPP Act. The statute was 
expressly created to punish parties for knowingly abusing the judicial process by bringing 
a meritless action for the purpose of interfering with and chilling a person's right to 
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petition government. Such abuse of the judicial process embodies the essence of bad 
faith. In contrast, the Act was not intended to punish unsuspecting plaintiffs who 
honestly seek a judicial remedy for genuinely disputed harms based on genuinely 
disputed conflicting authority, such as occurred here. 
As already noted, any evidence of bad faith is absent from the record in this case. 
Jacob also argued that Defendants' anti-SLAPP counterclaim resulted in an 
unconstitutional application of the Act, thereby arguing in good faith for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law. R1005, 1648, 1779. Indeed, after oral 
argument on March 16, 2004 on Bezzant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Judge 
Lynn W. Davis commended, "Well argued and well briefed ... I think it's nicely done on 
behalf of both of your clients.... I'll take the matter under advisement. There are 
technical issues here. If I spoke from the bench and made a ruling right now I might 
overlook evidence, et cetera." R3069:93. 
The district court then concluded that Jacob's claims lacked merit only after 
analysis of conflicting authority on point. Specifically, the court concluded that this 
Court implicitly overturned its holding in Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.5 with its subsequent 
decision in Larson v. Sysco Corporation6 such that a written statement constitutes libel 
per se only if it alleges criminal conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or 
operation of an unlawful business. Addendum B at 15. 
5
 626 P.2d 968, 977 n. 7 (Utah 1981) (defining libel per se as "defamatory words 
specifically directed at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and 
without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injurious"). 
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The district court engaged in similar analysis of additional pertinent authority. Id. 
Thus, the district court based its conclusions that a sanction of attorney fees was 
warranted not on a finding that Jacob's claims were frivolous or for any act of bad faith, 
but based on its legal conclusion that this Court implicitly overturned Seegmiller with its 
subsequent decision in Larson. 
Accordingly, the district court made no finding of bad faith based on any "factual 
determination of [Plaintiffs'] subjective intent." Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 
P.3d 556, 559 (Utah 2005). Rather, the court equated "without merit" with "bad faith," 
apparently and erroneously "believing that an absence of legal merit meant that bad faith 
could be presumed." Id. 
The trial court's analysis evidences the legal merit of Plaintiffs' claims under 
Seegmiller and other pertinent authority, thereby defeating the court's finding that 
Jacob's claims were so lacking in merit that Bezzant was entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs. It also defeats its conclusion that this was a SLAPP action, which by definition is 
completely lacking in merit. See, supra. Thus, Jacob was severely punished not for bad 
faith, but because he and his competent legal counsel did not accurately predict the trial 
court's unpredictable conclusion that this Court implicitly overruled Seegmiller, which 
case is still good law. 
Jacob's claims have a substantial basis in fact and law and were filed in good faith. 
The detail and significant analysis of the district court's ruling alone demonstrates the 
6
 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989). 
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substantial merit of Jacob's claims. Thus, the district court's conclusions are incorrect 
and the award of attorney fees is improper. 
B. Jacob Was Denied Due Process of Law When the District Court Refused to 
Permit Evidence of Good Faith. 
When Bezzant moved for attorney fees under the Act, he argued that Jacob's 
claims lacked a substantial basis in fact and law accused Jacob of being motivated solely 
by a desire to punish Bezzant for exercising his First Amendment rights. R1952; R1969. 
In response to Bezzant's allegations, Jacob submitted affidavits from himself and both 
current and previous counsel explaining Jacob's and his counsel's intent. R2\6l,et seq. 
(Addendum H). Attorneys David Aagard and Brent Stephens both submitted affidavits 
explaining how they independently conducted an exhaustive evaluation of the merits of 
Jacob's claims prior to filing suit. R2161. David Aagard in particular analyzed the 
merits of this case in light of Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998), and 
determined that that the facts in Mast were distinguishable from this case. Jacob's 
current counsel also addressed the distinguishing factors of Mast in Jacob's memorandum 
in opposition to the Bezzant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and during oral 
argument on March 16, 2004. Id. 
Bezzant moved to strike this evidence on the ground that those portions of the 
affidavits rebutting Bezzant's claims of bad faith were inadmissible. R2167; R2218. 
Without offering any analysis of its own, the district court expressly adopted Bezzant's 
arguments, concluding that the affidavits "consist of argument, opinions, and 
inadmissible legal conclusions"; accordingly, all of the evidence rebutting Bezzant's 
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claims and demonstrating Jacob's good faith was stricken. Addendum F at 3. The 
district court failed to recognized that the only way Jacob could rebut Bezzant's 
allegations of bad faith was through testimony explaining his intent and his attorneys' 
review of the merits of the case prior to filing. 
Moreover, the district court granted Bezzant's motion to strike Jacob's evidence in 
the same ruling wherein it granted Bezzant's motion for attorney fees. Addendum F. In 
other words, Jacob was not allowed to present, and the district court refused to consider, 
any evidence demonstrating his good faith, while Bezzant was permitted to make 
unsupported allegations of bad faith. This refusal resulted in Jacob being ordered to pay 
Bezzant over $200,000 simply for legitimately seeking a judicial remedy. Not only did 
the district court err in concluding that this evidence was inadmissible, but by excluding 
it the court denied Jacob of his right to due process of law. 
A person may not be deprived of property without due process of law. Utah 
Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment. The right to 
present evidence in one's behalf is an essential element of due process that is recognized 
as necessary to preserve fundamental fairness. See, Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 
1322 (Utah 1982) (right to present evidence is a "minimal procedural protection" in 
judicial proceedings); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650 (Utah 1988) 
(same); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1988) (in a prosecution for 
contempt, federal due process requires that the accused have the right to offer evidence in 
the form of testimony or affidavits). 
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Judicial standards are established upon due process principles of fundamental 
fairness and require the minimal right to meet an opposing party's claims by presenting 
evidence. McGrew v. Industrial Comm yn, 85 P.2d 608, 624 (Utah 1938). See also, Ut. 
R. Civ. P. 43 (mandating that all admissible evidence shall be admitted); Utah Code Ann. 
§78-32-3 (providing the right to present evidence by testimony or affidavit in a contempt 
proceeding). 
Jacob has a property interest in the $200,000 sanction imposed by the district 
court. But the court unfairly stopped Jacob from presenting any relevant evidence to 
rebut Bezzant's unsupported assertions of bad faith. The court merely adopted 
Defendants' position that "the assertions made in the affidavits consist of argument, 
opinions, and inadmissible legal conclusions." Addendum F. The district court also 
refused to address Jacob's contention not only that Bezzant opened the door when he 
made Jacob's intent an issue, but the evidence was not offered as argument, legal 
conclusions, or opinion. Rather, it was offered as evidence of Jacob's intent in filing the 
lawsuit, which intent Bezzant made the central issue of his motion for attorney fees. 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the district court erred in concluding that the 
affidavits were inadmissible and in striking them. Moreover, by doing so the district 
court prohibited Jacob from presenting any evidence in his defense and thereby violated 
his right to due process of law. 
C. Bezzant is Equitably Estopped From Seeking Attorney Fees. 
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As noted above, when Jacob requested information to support Bezzant's general 
Rule 11 defense (which is virtually identical to the sanction provision of the Act) that 
Jacob's claims lacked merit and were filed in bad faith, Bezzant was unable to provide 
any response other than to reserve the right to supplement as facts became known through 
discovery. R1540. No supplementation ever occurred. Bezzant is still unable to cite a 
fact to support his claim that Jacob filed this action in bad faith. Bezzant's admissions 
equitably estop him from now taking a contrary position. 
A party is equitably estopped from taking a certain position during litigation when 
the following three conditions are met: (1) the first party's prior admissions or failure to 
act is inconsistent with a later asserted claim; (2) there is reasonable action or inaction on 
the part of the second party based on the first party's admission or failure to act; and (3) 
allowing the first party to contradict its prior admission or failure to act will cause injury 
to the second party. Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28? Tfl4. 
All of these conditions are met on these facts. Bezzant admitted he could provide 
no facts supporting his defense that Jacob's claims were brought in bad faith and he 
failed to supplement that response. R1540. Jacob, knowing that his Complaint was filed 
in good faith, reasonably relied on Bezzant's admission and subsequent failure to act and 
thus continued to pursue his claims on their merits. Further, Bezzant's failure to respond 
to the discovery requests and thereby give Jacob notice of the specific facts supporting 
Bezzant's claim of bad faith is analogous to the invited error doctrine where a party is 
estopped from claiming error when it allowed the error to occur. See, Chang v. Soldier 
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Summitt Development, 82 P.3d 203 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Chaney, 989 P.2d 1091 
(UtahApp. 1999). 
When the district court allowed Bezzant to contradict his prior admission and 
failure to act, Jacob was injured in an amount exceeding $200,000. Accordingly, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Bezzant's claim for attorney fees under the anti-
SLAPP Act. 
D. The District Court Erred When it Awarded Bezzant Attorney's Fees Incurred 
for Litigating Jacob's §1983 Claims. 
Similar to the attorney fees provisions under the anti-SLAPP Act and Rule 11, a 
party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees related to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 only upon a showing of bad faith. See, Houston v. Norton, et at, 2158 F.3d 1172, 
1174 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that for an award of attorneys fees to be justified under 
42 U.S.C. §1988, "the plaintiffs action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless 
or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself 
a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. ... [A] plaintiff should not be assessed 
his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly 
became so"). 
As applied to the facts in this case, Jacob has pled facts sufficient to establish a 
prima facie claim of civil rights violations under §1983. Jacob's Amended Complaint 
alleges widespread abuses, including threats, intimidation, and retaliation by AFC public 
officials. R280:19-28, 30-31, 33-37. Jacob has also alleged that Tom Hunter and Ricky 
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Storrs were "exempt" AFC employees. R280:38-39. Further, there is no dispute that 
Hunter and Storrs insisted that the defamatory Notice be published or that they even 
wrote and/or approved of its content prior to distribution. Rl 529-30. Even the AFC 
mayor expressed strong and defamatory sentiments about Jacob relative to the 
controversy surrounding Hunter's and Storrs' exempt employee status. R280:40. 
Furthermore, in the Amended Complaint Jacob alleged that Bezzant was complicit with 
AFC public officials and employees and, therefore, was subject to suit pursuant to a 
§1983 claim. R280:40. Accordingly, when the facts and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom are interpreted in a light most favorable to Jacob, a prima facie claim was pled 
and might have been proved had the district court allowed discovery to continue. 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Jacob's civil rights claims under §1983 had 
both legal and factual merit, and the district court improperly awarded Bezzant his 
attorney's fees incurred for litigating those claims. 
E. The Law of the Case Doctrine Precludes an Award for Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs Prior to January 2003. 
When this matter was removed to the federal court on Jacob's §1983 claims, 
Bezzant's request for attorneys fees and costs was denied based on the federal court's 
January 15, 2003, finding after review of the merits of Jacob's claims that Jacob acted in 
good faith as to the removal. R1086. This finding is the law of this case. 
The law of the case doctrine "was developed to promote the obedience of 
inferior courts as well as 'to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same 
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case.'" Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001) 
(quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The law of 
the case will be enforced unless "exceptional circumstances" exist: "(1) when there has 
been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become 
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous 
and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea at 546. 
While the federal court denied Bezzant's request for attorney's fees based on 
Jacob's good faith related to the removal (R1086), it is noteworthy that the court's 
finding could only be made after it had reviewed the merits of Jacob's claims. Had the 
federal court concluded that Jacob's claims lacked merit and were filed in bad faith, it is 
unlikely that the court could have found that Jacob's removal of the case to the federal 
court was in good faith. 
Since the federal court's ruling denying Bezzant's request for attorney fees, there 
has been no intervening change of controlling authority, no new evidence has become 
available, and the federal court's ruling is not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in awarding Bezzant attorney's fees subsequent the 
federal court's ruling. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD AND THUS 
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT 
DEFAMATORY. 
The trial court concluded that Bezzant's statements did not constitute defamation 
per se and that Jacob had failed to plead special damages. Addendum B at 14-15. The 
trial court further concluded that the Notice was protected by Utah's public interest 
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privilege7 and that the statements did not convey a defamatory meaning. Addendum B 
at 16-17. While failing to construe the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to Jacob and failing to construe his allegations as true, the district court made 
fact-dependent findings that the statements were published amidst a heated political 
debate of which there was public awareness, there was no evidence of malice, publication 
was not excessive, and there was no evidence that Bezzant knew the statements were 
false. Id. 
Of course, these findings were made after discovery was stayed. The court also 
made these findings despite the facts showing that Bezzant published the Notice and 
revealed Jacob's name knowing the statements were false and also knowing that Jacob 
wished to remain anonymous. See, e.g., Rl604-06. 
The district court applied the wrong standard. To survive a motion for a judgment 
on the pleadings filed, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case, because all of the 
facts must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Fleishman v. 
Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383 (App. 2 Dist. 2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 350 (a 
motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute must be denied if the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, which if believed by the trier of fact, will result in 
judgment for the plaintiff). Further, because the context of the analysis is a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the district court was required to construe all facts and 
7
 Notably, in concluding that the statements were privileged, the district court cited 
Seegmiller, supra, which it previously determined this Court had implicitly overruled. 
Addendum B at 16. 
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reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Jacob and to accept Jacob's allegations 
as true. Here, Jacob established a prima facie case of both defamation and false light. 
A prima facie case for defamation includes, (1) the defendant published statements 
about the plaintiff; (2) that were false; (3) not subject to privilege; (4) with the requisite 
degree of fault; and (5) the statements resulted in damages. Debry v. Godbe, 872 P.2d 
999 (Utah 1994). A prima facie case for false light includes, (1) the defendant gave 
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false 
light; (2) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person; and (3) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard 
as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other was placed. 
Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah App. 1997). A false 
light claim is "closely allied" with a claim for defamation and "the same considerations 
apply to each." Id. 
There is no dispute that Bezzant published the Notice. Jacob has also 
affirmatively alleged that the statements in the Notice are false, not subject to any 
privilege8, and they placed Jacob in a false light and were published with at least 
negligence and a reckless disregard for the truth (see, e.g., R1643 (Jacob's JP Oppos.; 
Rl631-39). These allegations are fact-dependent and thus must be accepted as true and 
The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding the statements were privileged. 
Defamatory publications relating even to matters of public interest that are directed at 
private individuals are not privileged if the defendant was negligent in printing the 
defamatory material. Cox v. Hatch, 763 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). 
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all reasonable inferences construed in a light most favorable to Jacob. However, the 
district court failed to apply this standard. 
Further, the Bezzant's Notice was defamatory per se. A publication such as the 
Notice at issue here is libel. "[L]ibel is classified as per se if it contains defamatory 
words specifically directed at the person claiming injury, which words must, on their 
face, and without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized as injurious." 
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 977, fn. 7 (Utah 1981) (citation and quotations 
omitted). Libel is per se and actionable if it includes words "which impute to a person 
the commission of a crime, or degradation of character, or which have a tendency to 
injuriously affect him in his office of trust, profession, trade, calling, or business, or 
which tend to degrade him in society, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule ..." Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 83 P. 573, 547 (Utah 1905); accord, Prince v. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). A libelous accusation of dishonesty and 
"negative campaigning," such as occurred in this case, has a tendency to degrade the 
subject in society and expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. As such, it is 
defamatory per se and thus requires no pleading of special damages. Baum v. Gillman, 
667 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Prince v. Peterson, supra; Combes 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951). 
The district court rejected this Court's holding in Seegmiller, concluding without 
any supporting legal authority that this Court intended to implicitly overrule its own 
holding with its subsequent decision in Larson v. Sysco Court, 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989). 
The district court's conclusion is wrong. There is nothing in Larson to indicate that this 
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Court intended to overrule Seegmiller, which is still good law. Holding that a private 
person, such as Jacob, need only prove that media published defamatory statements 
negligently rather than with malice, this Court expressed particular concern that 
Seegmiller 
.. .was plucked by the defendant from the anonymity of private life and thrust 
against his will into the limelight. ... [W]e recognize that the integrity of an 
individual's reputation is essential to his standing in society, in his vocation, and 
even in his family. It may indeed be indispensable to one's sense of self-worth. 
The dignity of virtually every human being depends in part upon his right to be 
known as the person he truly is. ... [I]t has been recognized that an assault upon a 
person's character may be far more damaging and long-lasting than an assault 
upon his person. Indeed, freedom from false attacks on one's personality may be 
viewed as at least as essential to ordered liberty as freedom from physical abuse. 
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d at 972-73. 
However, citing Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998), the district 
court rejected Jacob's contention that he is not a public figure. Addendum B at 19. 
While the court's conclusion was incorrect, "the public/private figure distinction should 
not be a consideration that significantly affects a court's determination as to whether 
allegedly defamatory language actually conveys defamatory meaning as a matter of law." 
Mast v. Over son, 971 P.2d 928. The district court concluded that Bezzant's statements 
were "less caustic" than the statements in Mast and did not convey a defamatory meaning 
as a matter of law. Id. Finally, the district court concluded that Jacob's claims for false 
light and defamation are defective because Bezzant's statements are "non-actionable" 
editorial opinion rather than statements of fact, notwithstanding the fact that the 
statements were not published in an editorial. Id. at 20. 
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The district court's analysis and conclusions are incorrect. Mast involved a public 
debate surrounding the construction of a golf course that the Citizen Taxpayers of Utah 
("CTU") opposed. As CTU president, David Mast was willingly quoted in several 
newspaper articles and publicly interviewed regarding CTlTs position. During a 
subsequent press conference, Salt Lake County Commissioner, Brent Overson, accused 
Mast as falsely representing himself as a "concerned taxpayer" because Mast had a 
prospective financial interest in the property as a developer. Overson further stated that a 
CTU advertisement regarding the debate was "rife with misstatements and barefaced 
lies." 
Mast did not argue that Overson accused him of dishonesty. Rather, Mast argued 
that Overson's statements alleged criminal conduct and were defamatory per se. Finding 
that Mast was a public figure and had deliberately placed himself in the limelight, the 
appellate court concluded that the statements at issue did not allege criminal conduct and 
were not defamatory per se. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1998). These 
facts are inapposite to this case. Jacob has never "relinquished [any] part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call 
on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." Id. (citing Gertz v. 
Robert Welch Inc., An U.S. 323, 345 (1974)). 
Bezzant's Notice was an extraordinary strategic public relations campaign crafted 
to preserve friendships and business relationships. It was entitled "apology" and 
addressed to AFC citizens. Bezzant deliberately plucked "William T. (Bill) Jacob" from 
anonymity and falsely accused him of dishonesty, misleading the public, publishing false 
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information, and of negative campaigning to help one candidate by hurting another, 
thereby impugning his reputation for honesty and exposing him to public hatred, 
contempt and ridicule. This attack on Jacob's character was deliberate, methodical, and 
hand-delivered to the homes of AFC citizens. It was strategically designed to hold Jacob 
out as an object of public ridicule and contempt and received Hunter's and Storrs' 
express approval. The purpose was to distract voters from Hunter's and Storrs' conflicts 
of interest by holding a private person out as a target for public contempt. 
Accordingly, Bezzant's Notice constitutes defamation per se and Jacob's damages 
are presumed. 
IV. AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS HERE, THE ANTI-SLAPP ACT VIOLATES THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT COURTS SHALL BE OPEN FOR 
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. 
Article I, §11, of the Utah Constitution, also known as the Open Courts provision, 
guarantees access to the courts and prevents arbitrary deprivation of remedies. That 
provision specifically protects a person's right to seek a remedy for injury done to his 
reputation and "limits the legislature's ability to substantially modify or abrogate 
remedies to ... reputation." Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996). It 
specifically provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I of the Utah Constitution, also know as the Declaration of Rights, includes 
what are considered those important rights that are guaranteed to all citizens in our 
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society. The Utah Constitution was drafted amidst a long and oftentimes hostile power 
struggle between the federal government and the "Mormon" people of Utah who sought 
statehood as a way to "escape domination by the federal government." Charter for 
Statehood: The Story of Utah's State Constitution at 38-8, Jean Bickmore White (Univ. 
of Utah Press 1996). When the final and ultimately accepted draft of the Utah 
Constitution was debated in 1895, the public sentiment expressed was that" . . . the 
people want, and they have the right to demand, not a code of all the laws we have ever 
had or ever expect to have, but a plain, square, honest definition of rights and powers, and 
a broad basis for future legislation." Editorial, Deseret Evening News, March 27, 1895. 
Article I, §11, which has not been altered since 1895, has been recognized by this 
Court as a substantive provision guaranteeing access to the courts based on fairness and 
also providing remedies to persons who have been injured in their person, property, or 
reputation. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). It is intended to 
prevent the legislature from closing the courts' doors against any person who has a legal 
right associated with a recognized remedy. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 34, 151 P. 
366, 366-67 (Utah 1915). This Court further explained: 
[T]he plain meaning of the guarantee imposes some substantive limitation on the 
legislature to abolish judicial remedies in a capricious fashion. In general, open 
courts provisions in Utah and other states have served two principal purposes: 
First, they were intended to help establish an independent foundation for the 
judiciary as an institution. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: 
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 
(1995); Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825, 831 (1918) ("The 
question of ultimate legal liability cannot be withdrawn from the courts."). Second, 
open courts or remedies clauses were intended to grant individuals rights to a 
judicial remedy for the protection of their person, property, or reputation from 
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abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests that could control 
state legislatures. See Schuman, 65 Temp. L. Rev. at 1208; Berry, 717 P.2d at 675. 
Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ^ 30-31 (some citations omitted) (explaining the 
history of state open courts provisions created in response to political abuses that caused 
distrust of the legislature; also citing other Utah constitutional provisions specifically 
designed to limit legislative power). 
Article I § 11 expressly recognizes the right of access to the courts. "The clear 
language [of this provision] guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that 
is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 675 
(Utah 1985). Under this provision, Courts are to "resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Carman v. Slovens, 546 
P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). "At a minimum, a day in court means each party shall be 
afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them adjudicated on 
the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 
674-75 (Utah 2002). 
The seminal case analyzing the question of whether a statute violates the Open 
Courts provision is Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), in which 
this Court established a two-part test. First, section 11 is violated by a statute abrogating 
a right protected by it if the law fails to provide "an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy by due course of law for vindication of his constitutional interest... [which 
alternative remedy] must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy 
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abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one's ... 
reputation..." Burgandy v. State, 983 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1999). 
Second, if no such alternative remedy is provided, "abrogation of the remedy or 
cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. 
Jacob has a constitutional right to seek a remedy for damages to his reputation. 
That right existed prior to Utah's statehood and is expressly protected in Utah's 
Declaration of Righls. However, application of the anti-SLAPP Act to this case has 
completely abrogated Jacob's constitutionally protected right. Not only has Jacob been 
left with no remedy, he has been severely penalized just for seeking one in the first place. 
Further, the social or economic evil purported to be eliminated by the Act, the 
abuse of judicial process by large private interests to punish private citizens for 
participating in the process of government, does not apply in this case. Jacob is not a 
large private interest; he is a private citizen. Jacob did not file suit to chill anyone's First 
Amendment rights. Jacob filed suit because he was seeking a judicial remedy for a 
specific harm with a known remedy that has existed in this state since prior to statehood. 
The Defendants are not private citizens; they are large private interests owned by Pulitzer 
Newspaper Group at the time of the events giving rise to the claims in this case. R2161 
{see advertisement attached as Exhibit A to that pleading). When they published the 
Notice, Defendants were not participating in the process of government. They were 
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concededly seeking to preserve friendships and business relationships, and to hold Jacob 
out for public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. 
Because the Act completely abrogates Jacob's remedy for harm to his reputation, 
and because the societal or economic evil the Act was intended to eliminate does not 
exist in this case, its application to these facts is a violation of Jacob's constitutional 
rights under article I, §11, of the Utah Constitution. 
A. This Court Should Consider Jacob's State Law Claim Under the 
Exceptional Circumstances Doctrine. 
The exceptional or extraordinary circumstances doctrine allows review of issues 
that have not been raised below. See, State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996); 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^[23, 93 P.3d 186. It applies to "rare procedural 
anomalies" and is used sparingly "where [an appellate court's] failure to consider an 
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest 
injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^23. While the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine has not been precisely defined, it is considered a "safety device" to insure 
fairness and protect against manifest injustice. Id. (quoting Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8) (citation 
omitted). 
Although Jacob's open courts argument was not raised in the district court, the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine allows this Court to review the issue. Exceptional 
circumstances justifying review in this case include the fact that it involves important 
constitutional issues of first impression on how the anti-SLAPP Act is supposed to be 
applied, the case has not yet gone to trial so the issue has not been waived and it could be 
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raised on remand, and the issue involves questions of law that can easily be reviewed for 
the first time on appeal. Not reviewing Jacob's claim will also result in a manifest 
injustice because of the fundamental nature of the constitutional interests involved. 
A review of the important statutory interpretation questions of first impression in 
this case will not be complete without considering the state constitutional claim. 
Manifest injustice will be prevented by considering the state constitutional issue at this 
juncture. Moreover, judicial efficiency will be furthered and justice served by reviewing 
the issue. Therefore, the constitutional issue should be reviewed now. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to find that the anti-SLAPP Act does not 
apply in this case and is unconstitutional as applied to these facts, and thereby reverse the 
district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims as well as the court's grant of Defendants' 
motions for attorney's fees, and remand this matter back to the district court for the 
completion of discovery and trial. Respectfully submitted this day of April, 
2007. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Jenrjifer K/uowans 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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§ 78-58-101. Title This chapter is known as the "Citizen Participation in Government Act." 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-58-101, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 163, §§ 1. NOTES: EFFECTIVE 
DATES. -Laws 2001, ch. 163 became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. 
VI, Sec. 25. 
§ 78-58-102. Definitions As used in this chapter: (1) "Action involving public participation in 
the process of government" means any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, 
or other judicial pleading or filing requesting relief to which this act applies. (2) "Government" 
includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, official, employee, agent, or other person 
acting under color of law of the United States, a state, or subdivision of a state or other public 
authority. (3) "Moving party" means any person on whose behalf the motion is filed. (4) 
"Person" means the same as defined in Section 68-3-12. (5) "Process of government" means the 
mechanisms and procedures by which the legislative and executive branches of government 
make decisions, and the activities leading up to the decisions, including the exercise by a citizen 
of the right to influence those decisions under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (6) 
"Responding party" means any person against whom the motion described in Section 78-58-103 
is filed. (7) "State" means the same as defined in Section 68-3-12. 
§ 78-58-103. Applicability (1) A defendant in an action who believes that the action is 
primarily based on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while participating in 
the process of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant, may file: (a) an answer 
supported by an affidavit of the defendant detailing his belief that the action is designed to 
prevent, interfere with, or chill public participation in the process of government, and specifying 
in detail the conduct asserted to be the participation in the process of government believed to 
give rise to the complaint; and (b) a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c). (2) Affidavits detailing activity not adequately 
detailed in the answer may be filed with the motion. 
§ 78-58-104. Procedures (1) On the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings: (a) all 
discovery shall be stayed pending resolution of the motion unless the court orders otherwise; (b) 
the trial court shall hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as possible with the moving 
party providing by clear and convincing evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the 
complaint was to interfere with the first amendment right of the defendant; and (c) the moving 
party shall have a right to seek interlocutory appeal from a trial court order denying the motion 
or from a trial court failure to rule on the motion in expedited fashion. (2) The court shall grant 
the motion and dismiss the action upon a finding that the primary purpose of the action is to 
prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of 
government. (3) Any government body to which the moving party's acts were directed or the 
attorney general may intervene to defend or otherwise support the moving party. 
§ 78-58-105. Counter actions — Attorney^ fees — Damages (1) A defendant in an action 
involving public participation in the process of government may maintain an action, claim, cross-
claim, or counterclaim to recover: (a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration 
that the action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or 
continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (b) other 
compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the action involving public 
participation in the process of government was commenced or continued for the purpose of 
harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights 
granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (2) Nothing in this section shall 
affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by law. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; and 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, INC., 
dba AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
TERRY FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; RlCKY 
STORRS, an individual; CARL WANLASS, an 
individual; and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K. 
Spencer appeared on behalf of William T. Jacob ("Jacob") and Jeffrey J. Hunt appeared on behalf 
of Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant"). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully considered the 




(As Stipulated by the Parties) 
1. On or about October 26, 2000, William T. Jacob filed this lawsuit against Brett Bezzant, an 
individual; and Newtah, Inc., dba The American Fork Citizen New Utahl, a Utah 
corporation, in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. Jacob's 
Complaint alleged a claim for defamation against the Citizen and Bezzant. 
2. The Citizen and Bezzant were served with a Summons and a copy of the Complaint on or 
about February 13, 2001. The Citizen and Bezzant filed an Answer to the Complaint on 
March 2, 2001. 
3. An Attorneys Planning Meeting was held on March 22, 2001 between counsel for the 
Citizen and Bezzant and then-counsel for Jacob, David Aagard. At the conclusion of that 
meeting, the Citizen and Bezzant served their First Set of Discovery Requests on Jacob. 
4. On June 14, 2001, Mr. Aagard withdrew as counsel for Jacob due to health-related 
problems. The Citizen and Bezzant thereafter filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
requesting that Jacob obtain substitute counsel. 
5. On or about June 18, 2001, The Citizen and Bezzant submitted Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1) 
Initial Disclosures designating in part Tom Hunter, Ricky Storrs and Kevin Bennett as 
potential trial witnesses. 
6. On July 9, 2001, the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau ("Snow Christensen") 
entered its appearance on behalf of Jacob. R. Brent Stephens, a partner at Snow 
Christensen, specifically appeared on Jacob's behalf. 
7. On July 25, 2001, through Mr. Stephens, Jacob served his First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents on the Citizen and 
Bezzant. 
8. The Citizen and Bezzant agreed to grant Jacob's new counsel an extension in responding to 
its pending discovery requests. On October 24, 2001, Jacob served his Responses to those 
requests. 
9. On or about October 25, 2001, Jacob submitted Plaintiffs Rule 26(a)(1) Initial 
Disclosures, designating in part claims of specific damages. 
10. On November 9, 2001, Jacob filed Notices for five depositions he planned to take in this 
case: Ted Barratt (the Mayor of American Fork City); Tom Hunter (an American Fork City 
Councilman); Ricky Storrs (an American Fork City Councilman); Pamela Hunsaker (the 
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American Fork City Treasurer); and Kevin Bennett (the American Fork City Attorney). 
Those five depositions were taken by Jacob between December 2001 and February 2002. 
11. Jacob agreed to grant the Citizen and Bezzant an extension to respond to his discovery 
requests. On December 10, 2001, the Citizen and Bezzant served their Responses to 
Jacob's pending discovery requests. 
12. On February 26, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Motion to Compel based on Jacob's 
alleged refusal to, inter alia, disclose the identity of the members of the Nonpartisan 
Citizens Group and to provide documents concerning Jacob's financial condition. That 
Motion was fully briefed by the parties, and the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Notice to 
Submit the Motion for Decision on April 18, 2002. Because of subsequent events, detailed 
below, the Motion to Compel has not yet been heard by the Court. 
13. On May 3, 2002, Jacob moved the Court for leave to file an Amended Complaint. The 
Amended Complaint added two new plaintiffs - CPI and Phillips - and eight new 
defendants - American Fork City, Mayor Ted Barratt, Tom Hunter, Ricky Storrs, Kevin 
Bennett, Terry Fox, Don Hampton, and Carl Wanlass (collectively, the "City Defendants"). 
The new City Defendants were all various public officials of American Fork City. 
14. In addition to the defamation claim in the original Complaint, the proposed Amended 
Complaint added new claims against the Citizen and Bezzant for "false light" and for 
violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Amended Complaint also 
included various claims against the City Defendants, including procurement of defamation 
alleging that certain city officials directed Bezzant, who allegedly acted as the City's 
implicit agent, in publishing allegedly defamatory material. 
15. On or about June 6, 2002, Jacob filed a Stipulation and Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint, signed by counsel for all parties, in the Fourth District Court. 
16. On June 12, 2002, the Court granted Jacob leave to file his Amended Complaint and 
deemed the Amended Complaint filed as of that date. 
17. On or about July 11, 2002, the City Defendants filed an Answer and Jury Demand. 
18. On July 15, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the 
Amended Complaint. The Citizen's and Bezzant's Counterclaim alleged three causes of 
action: a claim under Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-58-101, et seq. (the "Anti-SLAPP Statute"); Wrongful Civil Proceedings; and Bad Faith 
Action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
19. On July 31, 2002, and pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Statute, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment seeking 
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dismissal of Jacob's and the other Plaintiffs' claims against the Citizen and Bezzant. 
20. Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP Statute, all discovery in this case was automatically stayed 
upon the filing of the Citizen }s and Bezzant's Motion as of July 31, 2002. See Utah Code 
Ann. §78-58-104(l)(a). 
21. On August 19, 2002, Counterclaim Defendants, CPI and Phillips, filed a Notice of Removal 
seeking to remove this case to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
The case was initially assigned to Judge Dee V. Benson, but was later transferred to Judge 
Ted Stewart. 
22. On August 26, 2002, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaim seeking dismissal of the Citizen's and Bezzant's Counterclaim. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a Notification of Claim of Unconstitutionality in 
the Federal Court. 
23. On September 5, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Motion to Remand this case back to 
the Fourth District Court. 
24. On September 19, 2002, the City Defendants filed a Motion to Disqualify Snow 
Christensen as counsel for Plaintiffs based on alleged conflicts of interest. In particular, the 
City Defendants alleged that Snow Christensen had previously represented some of the 
City Defendants on matters that were substantially related to the instant case. 
25. On October 2, 2002, Jacob - along with five other named plaintiffs ~~ filed a new lawsuit in 
federal court, purporting to be a class action, entitled Crookston, et ah v. American Fork 
City, et aL, Case No. 2:02-CV-1094 (the "Federal Lawsuit"). Mr. Stephens and Snow 
Christensen appeared as Plaintiffs' counsel in the Federal Lawsuit. The defendants in the 
Federal Lawsuit are the same City Defendants. The Citizen and Bezzant were not named 
defendants in the Federal Lawsuit. The Federal Lawsuit was eventually assigned to Judge 
Paul G. Cassell. 
26. On October 10, 2002, Jacob moved to consolidate this case with the Federal Lawsuit on 
the grounds that many of the issues in the lawsuits were allegedly similar. On that same 
date, Plaintiffs also opposed the Citizen's and Bezzant's Motion to Remand and requested 
that the case remain in federal court. 
27. On October 17, 2002, Plaintiffs opposed the City Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Snow 
Christensen as counsel for Plaintiffs. 
28. On November 7, 2002, David W. Slagle, chairman of the board of Snow Christensen, filed 
a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record for Plaintiffs. On the same day, Mr. Slagle, 
on behalf of Snow Christensen, moved to withdraw its opposition to the Motion to 
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Disqualify filed by the City Defendants. 
29. Snow Christensen simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs in the 
Federal Lawsuit based on the same conflicts of interest. 
30. Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs retained a different attorney to oppose Snow Christensen's 
Motion to Withdraw. On November 18, 2002, James Lowrie and the law firm of Jones 
Waldo Holbrook & McDonough entered their special appearance for this purpose. 
31. Also on November 18, 2002, R. Brent Stephens filed a "Notice of Recertification of 
Memorandum and Affidavit Pursuant to Rule 11" in which Mr. Stephens argued that there 
was no basis for his own firm's withdrawal as counsel for Plaintiffs. 
32. On November 25, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Snow 
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, and a Memorandum in Opposition to Snow 
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw their opposition to the Motion to Disqualify. These 
briefs were signed by Mr. Lowrie on Plaintiffs' behalf. 
33. On December 4, 2002, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Waiver of Oral Argument on their 
Motion to Remand and Request for Decision on the Briefs. 
34. On December 31, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Take Deposition of Don Hampton 
Pursuant to Rule 30(2)(c) and requested an expedited hearing on this Motion. Plaintiffs 
noticed Mr. Hampton's deposition for January 29-31, 2003. The deposition was requested 
pursuant to three pending cases: the present case, the Federal Lawsuit, and a separate case 
pending in the Fourth District Court before Judge Stott, Case No. 990402547, in which 
CPI was the plaintiff. 
35. On January 9, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Take Deposition of Don Hampton on the grounds that, inter alia, all 
discovery in this case had been stayed under the Anti-SLAPP Statute. 
36. Plaintiffs also sought to depose Mr. Hampton in the Federal Lawsuit. On January 10, 
2003, Plaintiffs filed a Stipulation and Motion in the Federal Lawsuit, signed by counsel for 
the City Defendants, which stipulated and agreed to take the concurrent deposition of Don 
Hampton on January 29, 2003. 
37. On January 15, 2003, Judge Cassell held a hearing in the Federal Lawsuit on Snow 
Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Jacob's counsel. Judge Cassell granted the Motion 
to Withdraw based on Snow Christensen's admitted conflict of interest, but permitted R. 
Brent Stephens to take the deposition of Don Hampton in the Federal Lawsuit as agreed 
upon by Plaintiffs and the City Defendants on January 29, 2003. 
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38. On January 16, 2003, Judge Ted Stewart granted the Citizen \s and Bezzant's Motion to 
Remand without oral argument, finding that the case had been improperly removed by 
Plaintiffs and remanding this case back to the Fourth District Court. Judge Stewart denied 
the Citizen \s and Bezzant's request for attorneys' fees. 
39. On January 29 and 30, 2003, Mr. Hampton's deposition was taken by Plaintiffs. 
40. On January 31, 2003, based on Judge Cassell's ruling in the Federal Lawsuit, the Citizen 
and Bezzant filed a Second Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel requesting that Jacob 
obtain new counsel in this case. On February 24, 2003, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this 
Notice (through Mr. Stephens) on the basis that this Court had not yet granted the Motion 
to Withdraw in this case, and that Judge Cassell's ruling in the Federal Lawsuit was not 
binding. 
41. On April 8, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed Notices to Submit for Decision requesting 
a ruling on Snow Christensen's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and on the City 
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify, both of which had been fully briefed. 
42. On July 1, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Third Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel requesting that Jacob obtain new counsel in this case so that the pending motions 
could be heard. On July 25, 2003, Plaintiffs again objected to this Notice, arguing that the 
Motion to Withdraw had not yet been granted. 
43. On August 13, 2003, following a telephone conference with the parties, this Court issued a 
Minute Entry clarifying that it had not yet received any portion of the file compiled by the 
federal court after this case was removed by Plaintiffs, which prevented consideration of 
some of the pending motions. The Citizen and Bezzant therefore undertook to obtain the 
record compiled while this case was pending in federal court and submitted a full copy of 
this record to the Court on August 15, 2003. 
44. This Court then scheduled oral arguments for November 6, 2003 on Snow Christensen's 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and the City Defendants'1 Motion to Disqualify. 
45. On October 24, 2003, Plaintiffs (still acting through Mr. Stephens) filed a Motion to Stay 
or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss this Action Without Prejudice. This Motion sought to 
stay this case until the Federal Lawsuit was resolved, and further requested that the Motion 
be considered prior to the Court's consideration of the Motion to Withdraw and the 
Motion to Disqualify. 
46. On November 4, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' 
latest Motion on the grounds that Mr. Stephens' continued participation in the case was 
improper given the pending conflicts issues, and because the Citizen and Bezzant were not 
parties to the Federal Lawsuit. 
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47. On November 6, 2003, the Court heard oral argument on Snow Christensen's Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel and the City Defendants' Motion to Disqualify. By bench ruling on 
that date, the Court granted Snow Christensen's Motion to Withdraw, effective 
immediately, and instructed counsel for the Citizen and Bezzant to prepare and serve a 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on Plaintiffs. The Court deferred consideration of 
the Motion to Stay until Plaintiffs had obtained new counsel. 
48. On November 6, 2003, the Citizen and Bezzant filed and served a Fourth Notice to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel pursuant to the Court's order. 
49. On December 10, 2003, Mr. Randall K. Spencer entered his appearance as counsel of 
record for Plaintiffs in this case. 
50. On January 6, 2004, Plaintiffs moved the Court to dismiss without prejudice all claims 
asserted by Plaintiffs against the City Defendants, to which the City Defendants stipulated. 
The Court subsequently granted this Motion. 
51. On February 2, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum in Opposition to the Citizen \s and 
Bezzant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On that same date, the Citizen and Bezzant filed a Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim. 
52. Both the Citizen's and Bezzant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim were subsequently 
fully briefed and submitted to the Court for decision. The Court heard oral argument on 
these Motions on March 16, 2004. 
IT. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. Newtah is a Utah corporation that, during the relevant time frame, owned and operated the 
print newspaper American Fork Citizen New Utah and the online version New Utah. Brett 
Bezzant was, during the relevant time frame, the publisher of the American Fork Citizen 
New Utah. 
2. The Citizen newspaper is published on a weekly basis and contains news coverage of local 
events as well as editorials on politics, current events, and other issues. The Citizen has 
approximately 3,000 subscribers. 
3. In October 1999 Jacob asked the Citizen to publish a political advertisement. Jacob then 
produced and paid for a political bulletin/advertisement claiming that Rick Storrs and Tom 
Hunter were legally prohibited from holding seats of the American Fork City Council 
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because both individuals were already connected to the City through ties that would create 
a conflict of interest. The Citizen published Jacob's advertisement on October 27, 1999, 
the final issue of the citizen published prior to the election. 
4. The content of Jacob's political advertisement is set forth below: 
NONPARTISAN CITIZENS GROUP INFORMATION BULLETIN 
A 1999 ELECTION QUESTION: CAN TWO CITY EMPLOYEES SEEK POLITICAL 
OFFICE? FACTS LISTED BELOW.... 
"••CANDIDATE RICKY STORRS** 
STORRS FACT #1: Candidate Storrs is a City employee 
functioning under the "Exempt Personnel Policies and 
Procedures" of the City. (See City Ordinance No. 92-05-
20) 
STORRS FACT #2: As a City EMT Ambulance Employee, 
Candidate Storrs, by City Personnel Policy, is prohibited 
from holding political office while employed by the City. 
(See City ordinance #95-05-21). 
STORRS FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Storrs has been 
employed by the City for several years. The public record 
indicates that Candidate Storrs failed to go on leave without 
pay from his City employment, while seeking election to 
political office. (See City ordinance #92-05-21) 
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Storrs 
to go on leave without pay from his City employment create 
a special privilege for himself while he is seeking election to 
political office, and if elected, will he give up his 
employment with the City during the term of his political 
office? 
••CANDIDATE TOM HUNTER** 
HUNTER FACT #1: Candidate Hunter is employed by the City 
as a health insurance consultant functioning under the 
"Exempt personnel policies and Procedures" of the City. 
(See City Ordinance #92-05-20) 
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HUNTER FACT #2: As a health insurance consultant, 
Candidate Hunter, by City Personnel Policy, is prohibited 
from holding political office while employed by the City. 
(See City Ordinance #92-05-21) 
HUNTER FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Hunter has been 
employed by the City since 1997. The public record 
indicates that Candidate hunter failed to go on leave without 
pay from his City employment, while seeking election to 
political office. (See City Ordinance #92-05-21) 
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Hunter 
to go on leave without pay from his City employment create 
a special privilege for himself while he is seeking election to 
political office, and if elected, will he give up his 
employment with the City during the term of his political 
office? 
5. Storrs and Hunter contacted the Citizen and complained about the political advertisement. 
Specifically, Hunter and Storrs questioned the veracity of the political advertisement and 
objected to the fact that they would not have a chance to rebut such allegations before the 
election. 
6. Based on information received from Hunter and Storrs, the Citizen published a political 
editorial, or election notice, on the New Utah web site and hand-distributed the election 
notice to American Fork Residents on October 30, 1999. (Jacob has characterized the 
allegedly defamatory material as an "election notice" whereas Bezzant refers to the 
allegedly defamatory material as a "political editorial." This Court will hereinafter refer to 
the allegedly defamatory material as an "election notice" to avoid confusion, but the Court 
will not attach any weight to such a label.) Bezzant paid the entire cost of printing and 
distributing the election notice. 
7. The full content of the Bezzant's election notice is set forth below: 
New Utah! Offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for 
campaign flyer 
Urgent Election Notice! 
To: All American Fork Residents 
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New 
Utah! 
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Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council Candidate 
Tom Hunter 
The Oct. 27th issue of the American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
And New Utah! Shopper carried a political advertisement 
that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and produced by William 
T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan 
Citizens Group." 
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! 
apologizes for distributing this flyer without giving Mr. 
Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe is 
false and misleading information regarding his service to 
American Fork City. 
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by 
American Fork City. Neither has he received any employee 
compensation nor any other employee benefit from 
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own 
Hunter & Associates Insurance and his firm was selected in 
1997 to act as an independent insurance broker on the 
employee benefits package for American Fork City. His 
firm provides this same kind of service for many other 
employers. 
Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City 
is a potential conflict of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if 
elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly identifying the 
potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting 
on any issue that involves his pre-existing interest in the 
employee benefits package. 
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is, 
to the best of our knowledge, a qualified and eligible city 
council candidate and his candidacy has not, in any way, 
violated the policies of procedures of American Fork City. 
We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs 
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick 
Storrs, citing a city personnel ordinance that does not even 
apply to Mr. Storr's part-time volunteer employment as a 
city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city 
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councilman and as an incumbent candidate have been well 
established in at least two other elections. We apologize to 
Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that 
would bring his candidacy in question. 
Comments on the flyer 
Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group. 
Since American Fork no longer has political parties, there is 
no such thing as a "nonpartisan" group. Unfortunately, this 
flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning intended 
to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe 
it hurts the entire process. Again, we apologize to 
Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this 
misinformation. 
8. Hunter and Storrs were subsequently elected to the American Fork City Council and 
continue to serve as Council members. 
9. On October 26, 200 Jacob filed a Complaint in the instant action against the Citizen. 
Jacob's complaint alleged that the Citizen's publication of the editorial defamed Jacobs. 
10. The Citizen filed an Answer to Jacob's Complaint on March 2, 2001. In the Answer, the 
Citizen alleged that Jacob's Complaint was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation ("SLAPP") designed to discourage the Citizen's commentary on issues of 
public interest. 
11. On May 3, 2002, after engaging in a contentious round of discovery, Jacob filed an 
Amended Complaint that included American Fork City and various city officials as 
defendants. The Complaint alleges a conspiracy between the Citizen and American Fork 
officials to deprive Jacob of constitutionally protected rights. 
12. The Citizen filed a Counterclaim against Jacob and two other plaintiffs identified as CPI 
and PMC soon after Jacob filed his Amended Complaint. The Counterclaim alleges that 
Jacob's actions in this case violated Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute. 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants Brett Bezzant and Newtah (collectively referred to as "Bezzant") ask this 
Court for a judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative for a summary judgment ruling, 
dismissing defendants from Plaintiff William Jacob's lawsuit. Bezzant contends Jacob's claims 
should be dismissed for three independent reasons: (1) Jacob's lawsuit is subject to dismissal 
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under Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute because its primary purpose is to prevent or chill Bezzant's 
proper participation in the process of government, (2) Jacob's claims for defamation and false 
light are defective, and (3) Jacob's assertion that Bezzant violated Jacob's constitutional rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not fulfill the elements set forth in the statute. 
A. JACOB'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER UTAH'S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
Bezzant argues that this lawsuit should be dismissed because Jacob's claims run afoul of 
Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute. Specifically, Bezzant contends that Jacob initiated this lawsuit as a 
retributive action designed to punish Bezzant's use of political speech and his legitimate 
participation in the political process. Conversely, Jacob argues this case does not contain any 
indicia of a SLAPP lawsuit because he has pursued this litigation in a good faith effort to prevail 
on the merits. Jacob also contends that the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the case 
at bar because the legislature passed the statute after Jacob filed his original Complaint. 
1. The Anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in the case at bar. 
This Court finds that the Anti-SLAPP statute does apply to the case at bar because the 
express language of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute demonstrates that the statute applies to pleadings 
other than the original Complaint. The language found in § 78-58-102(1) of the Utah Code 
indicates that the provisions of the Anti-SLAPP statute apply to "any lawsuit, cause of action, 
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or other judicial pleading or filing requesting relief." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-58-102(1) Similarly, § 78-58-105(1) of the Utah Code provides a remedy "upon a 
demonstration that the action involving public participation in the process of government was 
commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-
105(l)(emphasis added). These statutory provisions of the Utah Code clearly indicate that the 
Utah Legislature created the Anti-SLAPP statute with the intention that it apply to various 
instruments and stages of the litigation proceedings. 
Jacob did file his three page original Complaint before the Anti-SLAPP statute became 
effective. However, Jacob's filing of an Amended Complaint, consisting of 274 paragraphs and 
sixty-three pages of lext, subsequent to the date the statute was implemented brings this litigation 
under the purview of the Anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed, under § 78-58-102(1), any judicial 
pleading Jacob filed after the Anti-SLAPP statute took effect could conceivably subject Jacob to 
the provisions of the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute. 
Additionally, the Utah Anti-SLAPP statute is also applicable to the case at bar because it is a 
remedial statute. In a 1983 decision, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "remedial and 
procedural amendments apply to accrued, pending, and future actions." Stale v. Norton, 675 P.2d 
577, 585 (Utah 1983). In an earlier decision, the Court provided guidance as to what constitutes 
a remedial statute when it stated that "[sjtatutes enacted to promote and facilitate the 
administration of justice are prominent in the category of remedial statutes." State v. Higgs, 656 
P.2d998, 1002 (Utah 1982). 
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The language of the Anti-SLAPP statute supports an inference that the statute applies to a 
variety of pleadings and is a remedial statute intended to further the administration of justice. 
Indeed, the statute appears to be a prototypical remedial statute in that it is designed to further the 
administration of justice by reducing abusive litigation and providing a remedy to plaintiffs 
subjected to harassing lawsuits. As a remedial statute, the Anti-SLAPP statute encompasses 
"accrued, pending, and future actions" and can be applied to the case at bar. 
2. Jacob's actions in this litigation arc prohibited by Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute. 
When Utah enacted its Anti-SLAPP statute, § 78-58-101 et seq. of the Utah Code, it 
joined the growing number of states that have recognized the potential for strategic abuse of the 
legal system by individuals and entities attempting to interfere with a party's right to political 
commentary and participation. In response to a growing number of "Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation," or "SLAPP" suits, such states have enacted statutes similar to Utah's in an 
attempt to deter parties from filing frivolous lawsuits in retaliation for unfavorable political 
speech. In Beilenson v. Superior Court of Ventura County, the California Court of Appeals 
articulately set forth the policy concerns engendered by SLAPP lawsuits: 
SLAPP lawsuits stifle free speech. They undermine the open expression of ideas, 
opinions and the disclosure of information. The marketplace of ideas, not the tort 
system is the means by which our society evaluates and validates those opinion. 
The threat of a SLAPP action brings a disquieting stillness to the sound and fury of 
legitimate political debate. The SLAPP action . . . has no place in our courts. 
Beilenson v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 365 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute provides that "a defendant in an action who believes that the 
action is primarily based on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while 
participating in the process of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant, may file . 
. . a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12(c)." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-103(1). Defendant Brett Bezzant has filed such a motion 
in the case at bar. In order to prevail on his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Bezzant must 
demonstrate that the primary purpose of Jacob's lawsuit is "to prevent, interfere with, or chill 
[Bezzant's] proper participation in the process of government." Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-104(2). 
First, this Court finds that Bezzant's publication of the election notice at issue constitutes 
political speech and is afforded significant protection under the First Amendment. In 1976, the 
United States Supreme Court identified discussion of political candidate's qualifications for office 
as an area of political speech meriting First Amendment protection: 
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are 
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our 
13 
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such 
expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people." . . . In a republic 
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed 
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are 
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. . . . [I]t can 
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent 
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. Buckley v. 
Ka/eo, 424 U.S. 1,14-15(1976). 
Bezzant's election notice should be considered protected political speech because the 
content of the election notice addresses whether Tom Hunter and Rick Storrs should be eligible to 
hold positions on the American Fork City Council. Furthermore, the context surrounding the 
publication of the election notice, Bezzant's publication of the election notice in the midst of a 
heated political debate in the days leading up to an election, also supports the proposition that the 
election notice is prolected political speech. In accordance with the aforementioned case law, this 
Court finds that Bezzant's election notice is political speech entitled to broad protection under the 
First Amendment. 
Second, the evidence presented to this Court intimates that Jacob filed the litigation at 
issue for the purpose of chilling Bezzant's political speech and thereby preventing or interfering 
with Bezzant's proper participation in the process of government. The lengthy procedural history 
set forth in Section I of this opinion supports the proposition that Jacob intended to use this 
litigation as a means of punishing Bezzant for Bezzant's publication of the political speech 
contained in the election notice. 
B. JACOB'S CLAIMS FOR DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT LACK LEGAL MERIT 
Bezzant argues that Jacob's claims for defamation and false light are legally defective 
because (1) Jacob did not plead special damages, (2) the allegedly defamatory language is 
protected by Utah's "public interest" privilege and Jacob has not demonstrated that Bezzant acted 
with malice, (3) the allegedly defamatory language does not convey defamatory meaning, (4) the 
allegedly defamatory language is a non-actionable expression of editorial opinion, and (5) any 
statements of fact contained in the allegedly defamatory language are truthful and not defamatory. 
Conversely, Jacob contends that his claims for defamation and false light should not be dismissed 
because the allegedly defamatory language at issue is not protected speech and Jacob has 
established a prima facie case for defamation. This Court finds that Jacob's claims for defamation 
and false light are defective for the reasons discussed below. 
1. Jacob failed to adequately plead special damages 
Under Utah law, defamation can be either per se, in which case damage is implied, or per 
quod, in which case the plaintiff must specifically plead "special damages," / e. specific, 
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measurable out-of-pocket losses. If a complaint does not allege special damages, then the 
allegedly defamatory statements must constitute defamation per se in order for damages to be 
recoverable. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, No. 1:95CV0094K, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22143 
(D.Utah 1999). 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that slander per se only exists under the following 
circumstances: 
In order to constitute slanderer se, without a showing of special harm, it is 
necessary that the defamatory words fall into one of four categories: (1) charge of 
criminal conduct, (2) charge of a loathsome disease, (3) charge of conduct that is 
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or office; and 
(4) charge of the unchastity of a woman. If the words spoken do not apply to one 
of the foregoing classifications, special harm must be alleged. Alfred v. Cook, 590 
P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979). 
Whether the words of the election notice fall into one of the categories set forth in Alfred is a 
question of law for the court. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,^o. 1:95CV0094K, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 22143 (D. Utah 1999). 
Jacob contends that the allegedly defamatory language at issue constitutes libel per se, 
rather than slander, because the language was disseminated in writing. Therefore, Jacob argues 
that a libel per se standard should be used in the case at bar. In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court 
indicated that libel is classified as per se if it contains "defamatory words specifically directed at 
the person claiming injury, which words must, on their face, and without the aid of intrinsic proof, 
be unmistakably recognized as injurious." Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 977 n. 7 (Utah 
1981). However, nearly ten years after Seegmiller was decided, the Utah Supreme Court 
revisited the issue of defamation per se in Larson v. Sysco Court and employed the Alfred four-
category test, despite the fact that the allegedly defamatory language in Larson involved a written 
termination report. Larson v. Sysco Court, 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989). Specifically, the Larson 
Court dismissed Larson's libel claim because the claim did not allege criminal conduct, a 
loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or operation of an unlawful business. Id. at 560. Through 
its ruling, the Larson Court implicitly rejected the use of disparate standards for libel per se and 
slander per se and adopted Alfred's four-category test as applicable to both forms of defamation. 
This Court finds that Bezzant's election notice does not constitute defamation per se. Even Jacob 
acknowledges that the election notice alleges, at most, that Jacob acted dishonestly by 
disseminating misinformation to the public. Such claims do not constitute allegations of criminal 
conduct, a loathsome disease, unchaste behavior, or operation of an unlawful business. Since 
Jacob's allegations do not fit any of the categories outlined in Alfred, the election notice at issue is 
not defamatory per se. Because the election notice does not constitute defamation per se, Jacob's 
failure to plead special damages with specificity is fatal to his defamation claim. 
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2. The allegedly defamatory statements are protected by Utah's "public interest 
privilege11 
Utah recognizes a qualified privilege for publications regarding a matter of public interest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(5). The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the privilege certainly 
applies "when there is a legitimate issue with respect to the functioning of governmental bodies, 
officials, or public institutions, or with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public 
funds." Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc, 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981). In order to overcome the 
privilege the plaintiff must demonstrate that the publication was made with common law malice, 
was excessively published, or that the defendant had no reasonable belief in the truth of the 
statements made. Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992). 
This Court finds that the content of the election notice at issue is protected by Utah's 
"public interest privilege" because the election notice addressed the qualifications of candidates 
for public office and was published in the midst of a heated political debate surrounding those 
candidates. Indeed, the evidence presented before this Court indicates that there was substantial 
public awareness and concern regarding the candidacies and qualifications of Tom Hunter and 
Rick Storrs. 
Furthermore, Jacob's allegations and the facts of the case at hand demonstrate that Jacob 
has not overcome the public interest privilege. In order to defeat this privilege, Jacob must prove 
that Bezzant's statements in the election notice "were made with ill will, were excessively 
published, or [Bezzant] did not reasonably believe his or her statements were true." Russell v 
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992). None of the evidence presented 
before this Court satisfies Jacob's burden of proof in this instance. 
Jacob has nol shown that Bezzant's publication was motivated by ill will. In fact, the 
allegations set forth in Jacob's Amended Complaint indicate that Bezzant was not motivated by 
personal animus. Instead Jacob alleges that he and Bezzant enjoyed a six-year working 
relationship prior to Bezzant's publication of the election notice and that Bezzant published the 
allegedly defamatory language under the coercive influence of Hunter and Storrs. 
Nor has Jacob adequately demonstrated that Bezzant's election notice was excessively 
published. Utah law indicates that excessive publication can only occur where "publication of the 
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving it." 
DeBry v. Godbe, 992 P.2d 979 (Utah 1999). Jacob's Amended Complaint states that the editorial 
was only published twice: once in a preprinted article and once on the Newtah Internet website. 
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the publication at issue indicate that the election 
notice was published in an attempt to respond to an earlier political advertisement that Jacob 
published in Bezzant's newspaper. While it is true that the election notice was delivered door-to-
door in American Fork and perhaps had somewhat broader exposure than the newspaper's 
circulation of 3,000 households, the publication of the material did not extend beyond those who 
had a legally justified reason for receiving it. Bezzant's publication of the election notice was 
primarily directed to citizens of American Fork who had a direct interest in the upcoming election. 
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Under such circumstances, the context and scope of Bezzant's publication of the election notice 
indicate that Bezzant did not excessively publish the notice. 
Finally, Jacob has not shown that Bezzant knew the content of his election notice was 
false. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented to this Court support the proposition that the 
election notice's interpretation of certain City ordinances was the official legal interpretation of 
such ordinances as set forth by American Fork's political officials and legal counsel. Additionally, 
Jacob has presented no evidence that demonstrates Bezzant had reason to doubt the veracity of 
the information included in his election notice. Therefore, Jacob has failed to meet the requisite 
level of proof required to overcome the "public interest privilege" associated with Bezzant's 
publication of the election notice. 
3. The allegedly defamatory statements do not convey defamatory meaning as a matter of 
law 
Perhaps the principle defect in Jacob's defamation and false light claims is the fact that the 
allegedly defamatory statements at issue do not carry defamatory meaning as a matter of law. 
"Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law [.]" West 
v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has 
provided guidance for courts attempting to determine whether a statement conveys defamatory 
meaning. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "a publication is not 
defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because it makes 
a false statement about the plaintiff." Cox v. Hatch, 16\ P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). Rather, a 
court should look to whether reasonable people could reasonably infer defamatory meaning from 
the statement at issue. Id. Furthermore, in determining whether a particular statement conveys 
defamatory meaning, a court "must carefully examine the context in which the statement was 
made, giving the words their most common and accepted meaning." West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1009 (Utah 1994). 
The facts of the case at bar are quite similar to those found in Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 
928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); and therefore, an analysis of Mast provides valuable guidance as to 
whether the statements in the case at bar convey defamatory meaning. 
In Mast, David Mast, a private citizen, opposed the development of a local golf course. 
Mast published an anonymous advertisement arguing against the golf course in the local Salt Lake 
City newspapers. In this advertisement, signed by "The Citizen Taxpayers of Utah," Mast alleged 
that Salt Lake County Commissioner Brent Overson "misleads the public and continues to violate 
state law" by holding secret meetings and failing to disclose government records. Mast v. 
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 929-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
Overson subsequently held a press conference for the purpose of responding to Mast's 
allegations. At the press conference Overson identified Mast as the individual who placed and 
paid for the newspaper ad in question. Overson also stated that the ad was "politically motivated, 
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mean spirited, and a sham. Finally, Overson asserted that Mast had engaged in "character 
assassination" with an ad that was "rife with misstatements and bare-faced lies." Mast v Overson, 
971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Mast sued Overson for defamation resulting from the 
statements Overson made during the press conference. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that Overson's statements were not defamatory. Within 
its ruling, the Court set forth some of the policy considerations undergirding its ruling: "Overson's 
statements were not defamatory as a matter of law. The discourse between Mast and Overson is 
commendable for demonstrating why 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open,' and statements made in the course of such debate do not become compensable 
merely because they 'include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.'" 
Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). One section of the Mast ruling is 
particularly applicable to the case at bar. Commenting on Overson's statement that Mast's ad 
was "rife with misstatements and bare-faced lies," the Appellate Court held that, "because these 
statements were published in the context of a political debate on a public issue and the audience 
was thus not apt to take them at face value, there was no likelihood of damage to Mast's 
reputation and the statements, therefore, were not defamatory." Id. at 933. 
As previously mentioned, the similarities between Mast and the case at bar arc striking. 
First, just as the golf course controversy in Mast generated significant public controversy, Hunter 
and Storrs candidacies for the American Fork City Counsel attracted a great deal of public 
attention. Second, like Mast, Jacob placed an anonymous political ad in a local paper and used 
that ad as a vehicle for attacking the controversial actions of specific public officials. Third, like 
Overson, Bezzant publicly identified the individual who placed the political ad (Jacob) and 
indicated that he believed the political ad contained "false and misleading information." Finally, 
like Mast, Jacob sued Bezzant for defamation under the premise that Bezzant's imputation that 
Jacob's article was misleading harmed Jacob's reputation. 
Amidst all these similarities, two differences between Mast and the case at bar have 
captured this Court's attention: (1) Mast's voluntary involvement in the golf course controversy 
may have been greater than Jacob's involvement in the election controversy, and (2) the allegedly 
defamatory language in Mast was significantly more vitriolic than the language at issue in the case 
at bar. 
First, Jacob contends that Mast is quite dissimilar from the case at bar because Mast 
actively sought the public spotlight in connection with the golf course controversy while Jacob 
attempted to remain anonymous in regard to the election controversy. Jacob points out that Mast 
was quoted and identified as the President of Citizen Taxpayers of Utah in various newspaper 
articles and was even publicly interviewed regarding the golf course controversy. Based on such 
actions, Jacob argues that, Mast should be considered a public figure for defamation purposes. 
Conversely, Jacob asserts that his own actions in the case at bar are consistent with those of a 
private individual in that such actions demonstrate Jacob's desire to avoid the public spotlight. 
Jacob asserts that this public/private figure distinction is a critical difference between Mast and the 
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litigation presently before the Court. 
This Court cannot agree with Jacob's characterization of his actions as being consistent 
with those of a private citizen attempting to avoid the political spotlight. In the two year's leading 
up to Bezzant's publication of the election notice, Jacob was featured or quoted in at least fifty 
one different newspaper articles. Many of these articles focused on American Fork politics and 
highlighted clashes between elected officials and certain members of the local citizenry. Indeed, 
one article describes Jacob as having a "constant presence" in local politics and notes that Jacob is 
present at most meetings of the City Council. (See WTJ0393 and 0408 in Exhibit "A" of 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum). The evidence presented before this Court belies the 
proposition that Jacob is a private individual and indicates that Jacob has repeatedly sought the 
public spotlight when commenting on local political issues. 
Furthermore, this Court rejects Jacob's argument that the public/private figure distinction 
is a pivotal issue in the case at bar. Rather, the Court finds that it need not consider Jacob's status 
as a public or private figure for purposes of determining whether Bezzant's election notice 
conveyed defamatory meaning. Despite Jacob's attempt to portray the Mast decision as revolving 
on the standard of fault issue, that issue never arose in Mast and does not appear in the Mast 
court's opinion. A plaintiffs status as a public or private figure generally only comes into play 
when determining what standard of fault should be applied to a defamation defendant. 
Accordingly, the public/private figure distinction should not be a consideration that significantly 
affects a court's determination as to whether allegedly defamatory language actually conveys 
defamatory meaning as a matter of law. 
Second, the allegedly defamatory language in Mast is much more caustic than the 
language at issue in the current litigation. Whereas Bezzant indicated that he believed Jacob's 
political advertisement to be "false" "misleading," and "misinformation"; Overson described 
Mast's political advertisement in much more vitriolic terms. Specifically, Overson characterized 
Mast's political advertisement as being "deceptive . . . mean spirited, . . . and rife with 
misstatements and bare-faced lies." Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Despite Overson's scathing characterization of Mast's political advertisement, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that Overson had not defamed Mast because "these statements were published in 
the context of a political debate on a public issue and the audience was thus not apt to take them 
at face value." Id. at 933. The Court of Appeals further held that since "there was no likelihood 
of damage to Mast's reputation . . . the statements . . . were not defamatory." Id. Since 
Bezzant's statements regarding Jacob's political advertisement were considerably less caustic than 
Overson's diatribe, and because Bezzant's statements were published in the context of a political 
debate on a public issue, this Court follows the lead of the Utah Court of Appeals and holds that 
Bezzant's characterization of Jacob's political advertisement does not convey defamatory 
meaning as a matter of law. 
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4. The allegedly defamatory statements are non-actionable statements of editorial opinion 
This Court also finds Jacob's defamation and false light claims are defective because the 
allegedly defamatory statements contained in Bezzant's election notice are non-actionable 
statements of editorial opinion rather than statements of fact. In order to state a claim for 
defamation, a plaintiff must allege defamatory statements of fact that are "capable of being 
objectively verified as true of false." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1018 (Utah 
1994). In West, a 1994 case in which a mayor sued a local newspaper for comments appearing in 
the newspaper's editorial section, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that "the distinction 
[between fact and opinion] can only be based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the 
[allegedly defamatory] statement. Id. at 1018. The court then set forth four factors that are 
useful in distinguishing fact from opinion: "(1) the common usage or meaning of the words used; 
(2) whether the statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (3) the full 
context of the statement — for example, the entire article or column — in which the defamatory 
statement is made; and (4) the broader setting in which the statement appears." Id. 
Jacob's Amended Complaint only identifies four allegedly defamatory phrases in Bezzant's 
election notice. These phrases are quoted, in context, below. The allegedly defamatory phrases 
are in bold: 
(1) In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for 
distributing this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to 
what we believe is false and misleading information regarding his service 
American Fork City. 
(2) Mr. Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a Nonpartisan group. Since 
American Fork no longer has political parties, there is no such thing as a 
"nonpartisan group." 
(3) Unfortunately, this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning 
intend to hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hurts the 
entire process. 
(4) Again, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this 
misinformation. 
These statements apparently constitute the entire basis for Jacob's defamation and false light 
claims. It is the opinion of this Court that, under the factors set forth in West, the phrases at issue 
should be considered statements of editorial opinion rather than statements of fact. 
First, the common meaning of the allegedly defamatory words in the Editorial suggests 
that the words are nothing more than political rhetoric common to public debates. Phrases such 
as "negative campaigning," "nonpartisan, and "misinformation" are frequently used in connection 
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with politics and political issues. Furthermore, Bezzant qualifies phrases like "false and 
misleading information" by stating that "we believe" the information in Jacob's political 
advertisement is false. Bezzant's repeatedly uses phrases like "we believe" and "to the best of our 
knowledge" throughout the election notice and thereby intimates that the election notice contains 
editorial opinions rather than statements of fact. Indeed, this Court finds that, according to their 
"common meaning or usage," the phrases "we believe" and "to the best of our knowledge" carry a 
connotation that the speaker/writer using such phrases is stating an opinion rather than a fact. 
Second, none of the allegedly defamatory statements in the election notice can be 
objectively verified as true or false. With regard to the first phrase, Bezzant's use of the words 
"we believe" creates a statement of subjective intent immune to objective verification. The second 
phrase merely expresses Bezzant's opinion that the designation "nonpartisan citizens group is 
meaningless because American Fork City no longer has political parties. Similarly, in the third 
phrase at issue, Bezzant merely expresses the opinion that Jacob's political advertisement is a 
classic example of negative campaigning that "we believe . . . hurts the entire process." The final 
phrase at issue, where Bezzant apologizes for publishing "misinformation," merely echoes the 
qualified opinion Bezzant expressed at the beginning of the election notice and should not be 
construed as a statement of fact. 
Third, the overall tone of Bezzant's election notice, coupled with the fact that phrases like 
"we believe" and "to the best of our knowledge" are liberally sprinkled throughout the text, 
intimates that the content of the election notice should be construed as editorial opinion rather 
than factual statements. 
Fourth, the election notice regarding Hunter and Storrs candidacies was published during 
the final days of a heated political debate leading up to the American Fork City elections. Utah 
case law suggests that "courts are much more likely to construe statements as opinion when they 
are made by participants in, and people who comment on, political campaigns." West v 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1018 (Utah 1994). 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court holds that the allegedly defamatory statements 
contained in Bezzant's election notice should be considered expressions of editorial opinion rather 
than statements of fact. Therefore, such statements cannot support Jacob's defamation and false 
light claims. 
C. JACOB'S 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS LACK LEGAL MERIT 
1. Jacob's § 1983 claims fail because Bezzant did not publish the allegedly defamatory 
language "under color of lawM 
Bezzant contends, among other things, that Jacob's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should 
be dismissed because Jacob cannot show that Bezzant published the allegedly defamatory 
statements under "color of law." In contrast, Jacob argues his § 1983 claims are meritorious in 
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that Bezzant acted under "color of law" by publishing the allegedly defamatory language at the 
direction of American Fork City public officials. This Court finds that Jacob's §1983 claims are 
not meritorious because Bezzant did not act "under color of law" when he published the allegedly 
defamatory language at issue. 
"To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . the challenged conduct must 
constitute state action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F. 3d 897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, 
"attempts to charge the media with state action have generally met with a cool reception in the 
courts." Jones v. Taibbi, 508 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 n. 6 (D. Mass. 1981). In such cases "[e"|ven a 
'considerable degree of cooperation' between a private party and the state does not, standing 
alone, justify a finding that the challenged action . . . occurred under color of state law." Id at 
1073 n. 7. Indeed, in situations similar to the case at bar, courts have held that journalists 
involved in publishing newspaper articles have not engaged in the requisite state action to support 
state action claims. Idema v. Wager 120 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
Under the case law previously cited, and in light of the undisputed fact that Bezzant is not 
a government official, Jacob's claim that the Bezzant was acting under "color of law" can only be 
sustained if Bezzant voluntarily published the statements at issue at the behest of a government 
official acting in an official capacity. Jacob claims that Bezzant acted "under color of law" by 
publishing the allegedly defamatory language at the behest of American Fork City Councilman 
Rick Storrs. In effect, Jacob is asserting that his § 1983 claims derive from a conspiracy between 
American Fork City and Brett Bezzant. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that, in 
light of the potential for abusive lawsuits, courts impose a heightened pleading standard on § 1983 
conspiracy claims: "When a plaintiff in a § 1983 action attempts to assert the necessary 'state 
action' by implicating state officials . . . in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory 
allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically 
present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
This Court holds that Jacob has not met the heightened pleadings standard applied to § 
1983 conspiracy claims. Indeed, Jacob's § 1983 claims against Bezzant appear to be nothing 
more than conclusory allegations that lack the requisite factual undergirding necessary to survive 
summary judgment. Even Jacob's own allegations in prior pleadings indicate that Bezzant was 
not acting under "color of law" when he published the allegedly defamatory statements. 
Specifically, in his Amended Complaint Jacob alleges that Councilman Storrs was acting for his 
own private pecuniary benefit when Store's convinced Bezzant to publish the alleged defamation. 
Therefore, according to the arguments set forth in Jacob's Amended Complaint, Storrs was not 
acting in his official capacity when he asked Bezzant to publish the statements at issue. Since 
Storrs was not acting in his official capacity during the time in question, Bezzant's publication of 
the allegedly defamatory language cannot have a sufficient nexus with state action to support 
Jacob's § 1983 claim. 
Furthermore, this Court finds that Bezzant cannot be implicated in the conspiracy Jacob 
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has alleged if, as Jacob asserted in his Amended Complaint, American Fork government officials 
used coercive threats to procure Bezzant's publication of the election notice at issue. Amended 
Complaint Iff 172-74. Jacob's allegations that American Fork officials threatened Bezzant with 
lawsuits and lost advertising opportunities prevents Jacob from now claiming that Bezzant should 
be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Jacob of his civil rights. 
2. Bezzant is awarded attorney fees in connection with Jacob's § 1983 claims 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section! J . 
. . 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
Under the facts of this case, and in light of the extensive procedural history associated with 
Jacob's claims, this Court exercises its discretion and awards Bezzant attorney fees and costs 
associated with litigating Jacob's § 1983 claims. Such fees and costs shall be submitted by 
affidavit. 
D. BEZZANT'S COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT DISMISSED 
The facts and legal arguments pertaining to Bezzant's Counterclaim arc inextricably 
intertwined with the facts and arguments concerning Jacob's Complaint. Therefore, based on the 
foregoing legal analysis and in reliance on the facts and arguments previously addressed in this 
ruling, the Court finds Jacob has not met his burden of proof and declines to dismiss Bezzant's 
Counterclaim against Jacob. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby grants Defendant's Motion 
For Judgment On The Pleadings And/Or Motion For Summary Judgment and Denies Plaintiffs 
Motion To Dismiss Counterclaim. Brett Bezzant's counsel is instructed to prepare an order 
consistent with the findings contained herein. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of April, 2004. 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS AND/OR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
HIED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. Sta-e oi Uiah 
—:—~—™i,-fL, _ „ Depur*. 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant 
("Bezzant") andNewtah, Inc. ("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, 
the "Citizen'), and on the Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim filed by Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants William T. Jacob ("Jacob"), Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI"), and Phillips 
Manufacturing Company ("Phillips") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Oral arguments on these Motions 
were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K. Spencer appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Jeffrey J. 
Hunt and David C. Reymann appeared on behalf of the Citizen. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and carefully considered the motions, 
memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties, issued an extensive written Ruling on 
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Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
April 2, 2004 (the "Ruling"). The Ruling is incorporated herein by this reference. 
As set forth in and consistent with the Ruling, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. The Citizen's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby GRANTED. All of Plaintiffs' claims against the Citizen are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, 
jointly and severally, for the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by the Citizen in 
connection with litigating Plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amount of this 
award shall be submitted by affidavit from the Citizen's counsel. Plaintiffs shall pay the amount of 
this judgment to the Citizen no later than thirty (30) days from the date this Court confirms the 
amount of the award and enters and order consistent therewith. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this iffi^day of April 2004. 
BY THE COURT. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6 day of April 2004, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM was served, via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Randall K. Spencer 
SPENCER, SMITH & CARD, LLC 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; and 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, INC., 
dba AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
TERRY FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; RICKY 
STORRS, an individual; CARL WANLASS, an 
individual; and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Objection to the Affidavit of Jeffery J. 
Hunt Regarding Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Objection to Memorandum of 
Costs ("Objection"). These Parties stipulated to waive oral argument on the Objection and to 
allow the Court to rule based upon the pleadings. Accordingly, the Court has focused exclusively 
on the arguments contained within the memoranda and has not examined any of the other potential 
legal theories or arguments. The Court having carefully considered the Memoranda of the Parties 




1. On or about October 26, 2000, William T. Jacob filed this lawsuit against Brett Bezzant, an 
individual; and Newtah, Inc., dba The American Fork Citizen New Utahl, a Utah 
corporation, in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. Jacob's 
Complaint alleged a claim for defamation against the Citizen and Bezzant. 
2. Oral arguments were held on March 16, 2004. Randall K. Spencer appeared on behalf of 
William T. Jacob et al., ("Jacob" or "Plaintiffs") and Jeffrey J. Hunt appeared on behalf of 
Brett Bezzant et al., ("Bezzant" or "Defendants"). The only question still alive in this 
proceeding is whether the attorneys' fees for the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and costs 
of the trial awarded by this court were justly calculated. 
3. This court resolved the underlying First Amendment/slander dispute in this case on April 2, 
2004, dismissing Jacob's anti-SLAPP and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and failing to dismiss 
Bezzant's counterclaim. This Court also awarded attorneys' fees to Bezzant in connection 
with Jacob's § 1983 claims. 
4. On or about April 6, 2004, Defendants submitted the Affidavit of Jeffery J. Hunt Regarding 
Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("Affidavit of Fees") stating the fees and 
costs incurred in connection with the § 1983 claims. 
5. On or about April 12, 2004, Defendants submitted Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.'s 
Memorandum of Costs and Necessary Disbursements ("Memo of Costs") detailing the 
costs incurred in connection with this matter pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
54(d). 
6. On or about April 19, 2004, Plaintiffs submitted the Objection. 
7. On or about May 6, 2004, Defendants submitted Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc.'s 
Response to the Objection ("Response"). 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
At the outset it is important to note that Plaintiffs' Objection does not claim that the court 
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acted outside its discretion in granting attorneys' fees pursuant to its 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authority.1 
As Defendants' Response notes, "[t]he Court's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was fully 
supported and justified by the record, and it need not be revisited here." [Response at p. 5]. 
Plaintiffs list three specific objections to the attorneys' fees and costs awarded to the 
Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that: 1) Awarding fees and costs to Defendants violates the Law of 
the Case doctrine because the federal court already denied attorneys' fees and costs for claim 
brought in this matter on January 15, 2003 (therefore, at most the court could award fees for 
actions taken after January 15, 2003); 2) the affidavit on fees was not sufficiently specific to show 
that the attorneys were working on § 1983 claims; and the hourly rates they charged were 
excessive; 3) the court order did not award costs for any part of the trial not related to § 1983 
claim, so the cost claimed in Defendants' Memo of Costs should be denied. 
A. Law of the Case Doctrine 
Plaintiffs claim that awarding attorneys' fees in this matter, at least before January 15, 
2003, is contrary to the federal court's decision not to award fees and violates the law of the case 
doctrine, which is designed to avoid "reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in 
the same case." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 31 P.3d 543, 546 (Utah 2001). 
Defendants counters that the federal court was not addressing the underlying merits of the 
substantive claims when it refused to award fees and costs. The law of the case doctrine as 
addressed in Gildea is not implicated since the substantive claims were not "previously decided" by 
1
 Plaintiffs maintain that their claims under § 1983 were brought in good faith, but they do not further object to the 
Court's April 2, 2002 Ruling where the court exercised discretion pursuant to § 1988 granting reasonable 
attorneys' fees for the § 1983 claim. Their objections relate primarily to the way the fees were calculated, not to 
the Court's § 1988 authority. 
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the federal court and cannot therefore be "reconsidered." Id. 
The federal court found that the case had been improperly removed and remanded the 
matter back to this Court. Notwithstanding its decision to remand, the federal court found no bad 
faith in Plaintiffs' attempt to remove the case and therefore didn't award fees for the removal. The 
Response cites the federal court's order finding that "the removal was an attempt to expand 
removal law and was made in good faith. Accordingly the court will not award attorneys' fees." 
[Response p. 4] However, when the federal court refused to award fees and costs it was 
addressing the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) removal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim. As a 
result, the federal court's decision not to award fees in the removal matter has nothing to do with 
this court's decision to grant the fees under § 1988 in the § 1983 substantive claim. Thus, this 
Court's award in no way implicates the law of the case and is appropriate. 
B. Deficiencies in the Affidavit Regarding Fees and Costs 
1. Insufficient Specificity of Attorneys' Fees 
Plaintiffs claim that the Affidavit of Fees fails to adequately separate costs and fees 
associated with the § 1983 claims from other anti-SLAPP claims that were litigated jointly. In 
such cases, attorney fees must be "allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). Plaintiffs also cite Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 
56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002), requiring that the claims for fees be separated into 1) successful claims 
for which there may be entitlement to attorney's fees, 2) unsuccessful claims which would have 
carried entitlement to attorney's fees, and 3) claims with no entitlement to attorney's fees, so that 
fees may be awarded only on prevailing claims. In the case before this Court, the distinction 
between successful and unsuccessful claims seems irrelevant since the Defendants prevailed on all 
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claims. 
To separate the fees associated with the § 1983 claim, Mr. Hunt conservatively looks at 
four isolated proceeding where the § 1983 claim was litigated and asks for fees for one-third of the 
hours in each of these matters. He uses only one-third of the hours because there were two other 
primary claims litigated along with the § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs' Objection offers no alternative for 
calculating the fees, instead they merely state that the Affidavit of Fees has not sufficiently 
separated the fees awarded by this Court from the fees spent on other claims jointly litigated. 
In contrast, Defendants assert that the Affidavit of Fees completely complies with the rule 
governing attorney's fees affidavits, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful review, this 
Court agrees that the Affidavit of Fees provides the amount claimed and explains how this amount 
was calculated. Rule 73(b)(2) requires a "reasonably detailed description of the time spent and 
work performed." Mr. Hunt identified specific events related to the claim, identified the attorneys 
who did the work and gave their billing rates, and reasonably discounted the hours by two-thirds to 
account for the unrelated claims that were argued jointly with the § 1983 claim. Rule 73(b)(2) 
requires the affidavit to provide "factors showing the reasonableness of the fees." In addition to 
the factors above, the Affidavit of Fees states that although this litigation has stretched over four 
years with a total bill well over $115,000, the amount claimed is only a small fraction of this total. 
Furthermore, the claims in this litigation were always prepared and argued jointly. Consequently, 
it would be unreasonable to separate the exact hours and days spent on the § 1983 claim from the 
other claims litigated. Mr. Hunt offers his professional judgment that at least one third of this time 
was spent on the § 1983 claim. In sum, the Affidavit of Fees meets the standard of reasonableness 
required by Rule 73, as well as satisfying the Valcarce requirement of allocating costs to separate 
5 
claims. 961 P.2dat318. 
2. Excessive Rates 
Plaintiffs also argue that the rates charged by attorneys at Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless were excessive. However, this claim of excessiveness does not appear to be accurate. 
Mr. Hunt testified to the reasonableness of the rate for his experience and expertise in the Salt 
Lake City market. Moreover, although the Plaintiffs are currently represented by a less expensive 
lawyer from Utah County, during much of this litigation they were represented by the Salt Lake 
City office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
C. Award of Costs Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) 
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants' Memo of Costs improperly included the total costs 
incurred in this litigation. Plaintiffs claim that because this Court has not expressly awarded these 
costs, the Defendant can only collect costs associated with the § 1983 claim. 
Defendants rebut this proposition by citing Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1): "[An award of all 
costs] shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." The 
court order did not explicitly direct that these costs not be awarded, and this Court's order 
allowing fees and costs related to Defendants in the matter of the § 1983 claim should not be 
interpreted to preclude Defendants from receiving the other costs associated with the litigation 
pursuant to Rule 54. Further, Defendants subtracted the costs included in the § 1988 award of 
costs and fees from the total costs claimed in the Memo of Costs to avoid double counting. 
Hence, the Memo of Costs conforms to Rule 54 and the costs claimed appear reasonable. 





Accordingly, this Court hereby denies Plaintiffs' Objection to Affidavit of Jeffery J. Hunt 
Regarding Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and Objection to Memorandum of 
Costs. Consistent with the findings contained herein, the Court will now execute the previously 
submitted "Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988" and the "Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and Necessary Disbursements." 
Counsel for Defendants, Mr. Hunt, is hereby instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this 
Ruling. 
DATED this / ^ ^ a y of August, 2004. 
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PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING AWARD OF COSTS 
AND NECESSARY 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Memorandum of Costs and Necessary 
Disbursements of Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc. 
("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen "). 
The Court having considered the Citizen's Memorandum of Costs and Necessary 
Disbursements and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, and pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(d) and the Court's previously-entered Order and Judgment Granting Defendants' Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. The Citizen is hereby awarded costs and necessary disbursements in the amount of 
$6.386.22. 
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2. Plaintiffs shall pay this judgment to the Citizen within thirty (30) days of the date of 
this Order and Judgment. 
DATED this / ? ^ a y of ^/&i<f//J^2004 
/ iton^Lynn W. Davis 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495) 
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185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
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STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
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BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1988 
Civil No. 000403530 





BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Attorneys' 
Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated April 2,2004. In that Ruling, the Court awarded Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc. ("Newtah") d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
(collectively, the "Citizen") the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by the Citizen in 
litigating claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants William 
T. Jacob ("Jacob"), Commercial Properties, Inc. ("CPI"), and Phillips Manufacturing Company 
("Phillips") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). 
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The Court having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials 
submitted by the parties, hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. The amount of the award and judgment entered against Plaintiffs, jointly and 
severally, and in favor of the Citizen, is determined to be $13,693.94. 
2. Plaintiffs shall pay this judgment to the Citizen within thirty (30) days of the date of 
this Order and Judgment. 
day of DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
lon.'i^ynn W. Davis 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
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BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 





MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
These matters came before the Court on two motions filed by Defendants and 
Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant ("Bezzant") and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American Fork Citizen New 
Utah! ("Newtah") (collectively, the "Citizen"): (1) The Citizen's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed October 19, 2004; and (2) The Citizen's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of 
Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob ("Motion 
to Strike"), filed March 18, 2005. A hearing was held on both motions at 1:30 p.m. on September 
13, 2005, Randall K. Spencer representing Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants, and Jeffrey J. 
Hunt and David C. Reymann representing the Citizen. The Court, having considered the pertinent 
materials submitted by the parties and having heard the arguments of counsel, issued a written 
Ruling Re: Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, 
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R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, dated September 16,2005 (the "Ruling"), which is incorporated herein by this reference. 
For the reasons set forth in the Ruling and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS 
the Citizen 9s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike in full and as prayed for. 
The Citizen is hereby awarded all costs and reasonable attorneys fees it has incurred in this action 
from April 30, 2001 through the date of entry of this Order, less the amount of attorneys fees and 
costs already awarded to the Citizen by this Court. The amount of this award shall be established 
by affidavit submitted by counsel for the Citizen, subject to Court approval. 
DATED t h i s / p day of ^/^l^fy^fJ 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of September 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served, via facsimile and U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, on the following: 
Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
\7JW-
David C. Reymann / 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, 
INC., dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN 
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterciaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
RULING RE: PROPOSED ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT REGARDING 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) 
Case # 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Counterciaimants' submission of^Proposed Order 
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-
105(1) (a). The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues 
the following ruling. 
RULING 
The Court notes that Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. 
d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") submitted a Proposed Order 
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs with an accompanying Affidavit of 
Jeffrey J. Hunt on October 21, 2005. On October 27, 2005, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to the 
Proposed Order. Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Objection and a Request to Submit for 
Decision on November 14, 2005. 
Defendants assert that the basis for the Court's award of costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees arises under Section 105(l)(a) of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). In his affidavit, counsel for Defendants Jeffrey Hunt attests that he has 
reviewed his firm's billing records and his files to confirm the reasonableness and accuracy of the 
figures he has claimed. Mr. Hunt has provided the Court with a spreadsheet prepared by his film's 
accounting department showing the hours spent and fees and costs incurred by the Citizen on a 
monthly basis by each attorney that has worked on the case. Mr. Hunt has also included a printout 
of the state court docket in the case and a printout of the docket in the case during the time it was 
removed to federal court. 
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Plaintiffs object to the proposed order, arguing that they are entitled to conduct discovery 
relative to Defendants' counterclaim and that it is inappropriate to award attorneys' fees and costs 
on the representations of counsel's affidavit alone. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs have not filed 
any objection to Mr. Hunt's affidavit or challenged in any way the reasonableness or accuracy of the 
costs and attorneys' fees set forth by Mr. Hunt. Defendants argue that Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure specifies the substantive requirements for affidavits regarding attorneys' fees and 
that Mr. Hunt has met the specified requirements. In addition, Defendants respond that the request 
for additional discovery is outrageous in the context of this case because it is an attempt to further 
prolong litigation that has been pending for more than five years. 
The Court notes Plaintiffs' objection to the proposed order and argument regarding 
discovery. The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "[calculation of reasonable attorney fees is 
in the sound discretion of the trial court" but "must be supported by evidence in the record." Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has identified four 
questions that must be addressed by the trial court before attorneys' fees may be assessed: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the 
matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
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Id at 990. 
This Court notes that in order to perform a proper analysis of the reasonableness of 
Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs, this Court will require more specific information than a 
general accounting summary statement and a copy of court dockets. The Court has reviewed Exhibit 
"C" of Mr. Hunt's affidavit and requests that Mr. Hunt supplement his affidavit to more fully 
delineate the work performed during the months in question and the hours billed to each task. If 
such an accounting can no longer be accessed through the law firm's record keeping systems, copies 
of the monthly invoices summarized in Exhibit "C" may be an appropriate submission for the 
Court's review, or counsel should assess their file and records and prepare a summary of work 
performed with attendant hours and billings. 
The Court hereby respectfully denies Plaintiffs' request for discovery relating to the award 
of attorneys' fees. The Court requests that counsel for Defendants supplement his affidavit within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Ruling. 
Dated this / ^ day of January, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: . >v 'F J ^ C 
JUD'GE FRED D/HOWARD \: \ * J 
District Court Judge V \ «, J 
HT-JV 
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David C. Reymann 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, 
INC., dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN 
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
RULING RE: SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY J. HUNT 
REGARDING COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES; and 
PROPOSED ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-
105(l)(a) 
Case # 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' submission of a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in conjunction with their earlier 
submission of a Proposed Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(1)(a). The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby issues the following ruling. 
RULING 
The Court notes that Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. 
d/b/a The American Fork Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") submitted a Proposed 
Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs with an accompanying 
Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt on October 21, 2005. On January 12, 2006, the Court issued a 
Ruling requesting that Mr. Hunt supplement his affidavit to more fully delineate the work 
performed during the months in question and the hours billed to each task. Defendants submitted 
a Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and Attorneys5 Fees on January 19, 
2006. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Supplemental Affidavit on January 27, 2006 and 
Defendants filed a Response and Renewed Request to Submit for Decision on February 2, 2006. 
On February 8, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Reply to Defendants' Response. 
Defendants assert that the basis for the Court's award of costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees arises under Section 105(l)(a) of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). Attached to the supplemental affidavit of Jeffrey Hunt are copies 
of monthly invoices from his firm's accounting department detailing the work performed, hours 
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billed, and fees and costs incurred by the Citizen for each month from April 30, 2001 through the 
end of September 2005. 
Plaintiffs object to the Supplemental Affidavit, arguing that it is inappropriate to award 
Defendants attorneys' fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs assert that attorney 
Jeffrey Hunt took this matter on a pro bono basis to garner media attention and obtain publicity 
as a First Amendment attorney and therefore object that there is no indication in the exhibits that 
Defendant Bezzant ever paid any fees or costs in this matter . Defendants respond that Plaintiffs' 
Objection neither objects to nor challenges the necessity, reasonableness, or accuracy of the costs 
and attorneys' fees set forth in Mr. Hunt's supplemental affidavit or previously filed affidavit and 
the Court should therefore enter judgment for the full amount of such costs and fees. 
The Court notes Plaintiffs' objection to the Supplemental Affidavit and assertion that 
counsel for Defendants took this matter on a pro bono basis and that the fees were thus never 
"incurred" by Defendants. The Court notes that the Supplement Affidavit filed by Mr. Hunt 
includes detailed monthly invoices setting forth work performed, costs incurred, and hours billed 
in this matter. Whether Mr. Hunt worked pro bono is irrelevant in determining the 
reasonableness of Mr. Hunt's claimed attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Court respectfully 
overrules Plaintiffs' objection. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "[calculation of reasonable attorney fees is 
in the sound discretion of the trial court" but "must be supported by evidence in the record." 
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has 
identified four questions that must be addressed by the trial court before attorneys' fees may be 
assessed: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute 
the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality 
for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including 
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
Id at 990. 
The Court notes that the legal services provided by counsel for Defendants generally 
included telephone conferences; research; drafting and reviewing correspondence, documents, 
and pleadings; participating in discovery and depositions; and preparation for and attendance at 
hearings. For the period of time between April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, Mr. 
Jeffrey Hunt spent a total of 374 hours performing these legal services. During the years in 
question, Mr. Hunt's billing rate ranged from $200.00 per hour to $250.00 per hour. Mr. David 
Reymann spent a total of 513.75 hours performing legal services, billed at a rate ranging from 
$150.00 per hour to $190.00 per hour. The Court also notes that Mr. Edward Carter spent 4.5 
hours on the matter, billed at $115.00 per hour. Various paralegals also performed services 
totaling 5.05 hours, billed at a rate ranging from $75.00 per hour to $100.00 per hour. The Court 
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finds that the billing rates charged by Defendants' counsel and law firm staff are consistent with 
rates customarily charged in this area for this type of service. The Court likewise finds that the 
services rendered by Defendants' counsel were reasonably necessary to defend the issues raised 
in the complaint. Finally, the Court does not find any additional factors that would preclude the 
Court from awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. 
The Court previously awarded the Citizen $6,386.22 for costs incurred from February 
of 2001 until March of 2004. Since March of 2004, the invoices attached to Mr. Hunt's 
Supplemental Affidavit include costs for long distance telephone calls, photocopies, facsimiles, 
Lexis research, and a transcript fee. The Court notes that it may award to Defendants "costs" 
that are properly taxable under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In regard to costs 
that may be awarded, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Costs were not recoverable at 
common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner 
provided by statute." Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). Elucidating upon the 
meaning of "costs," the Court stated, "The generally accepted rule is that it means those fees 
which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize 
to be included in the judgment." Id. at 774. The Court has also declared that "[tjhere is a 
distinction to be understood between the legitimate and taxable 'costs' and other expenses of 
litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs." Id. See also 
Young v. Utah, 16 P.3d 549, 553 (Utah 2000). This Court finds that the costs requested by Mr. 
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Hunt cannot be considered "taxable costs" as required by the Utah Supreme Court and therefore 
denies Mr. Hunt's request for costs incurred since March of 2004. 
The Court finds that since April 30, 2001, through the end of September 2005, the 
Citizen has incurred $169,427.50 in attorneys' fees in connection with this case. The Court notes 
that it previously awarded the Citizen attorneys' fees of $13,693.94 in connection with the 
Section 1988 Order. Therefore, the Court awards the Citizen additional attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $155,733.56 for legal services performed. Contemporaneous with this Ruling, the 
Court will sign the Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys' Fees & Costs that was 
previously submitted by Defendants. 
Dated this ^ f f i ^day of March, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUZ5GE FRED D^HOWA|p | 
District Court Judge 
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3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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David C. Reymann 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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of Utah County, State of Utah 
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855) 
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
58-105(l)(a) 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written Ruling Re: 
Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent 
Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the 
"Ruling") and subsequent Order Granting Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (the "Order"). The Ruling and Order are incorporated herein by this reference. 
This Order and Judgment determines the amount of costs and reasonable attorneys fees to be 
awarded to the Citizen. 
The Court, having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials 
submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, 
hereby ORDERS as follows: 
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1. The Court finds that the attorneys fees and costs detailed in the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt 
were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-captioned case 
for all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and are properly recoverable under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). 
2. The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor 
of the Citizen in the amount of $155JT33«5k This amount represents $155,1-33*^ in reasonably 
incurred attorneys fees and $ O in costs incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-
captioned matter from April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, less the amount of 
attorneys fees and costs already awarded to the Citizen by prior Order and Judgment. 
3. With respect to the prior awards, on or about August 12, 2004, this Court entered an 
Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the 
"Section 1988 Order"), which awarded the Citizen attorneys fees in the amount of $13,310.83 and 
costs in the amount of $383.11. On August 12, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court also entered an Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and 
Necessary Disbursements to the Citizen (the "Costs Order"), as the prevailing party under Rule 
54(d). The Costs Order awarded the Citizen costs in the amount of $6,386.22. Collectively, the 
Section 1988 Order and the Costs Order are referred to herein as the "Prior Judgments". The 
amounts already awarded under the Prior Judgments have been deducted from the Citizen fs present 
request and are not duplicative with this judgment. 
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4. All amounts awarded hereunder, as with the Prior Judgments entered by the Court, 
shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date of entry. 
5. The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred after September 2005 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall 
be awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the 
Citizen's counsel. 
DATED this j f l ^ d a y o f ^ f e a f 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
^
xfJL*£o 
Hon/Fred D. Howard 
Fourth District Court J u d g d | i k V ^ 
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Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855) 
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given that 
on March 29,2006 the Court herein entered its Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). A true and correct copy of this Order and 
Judgment is attached hereto. 
DATED this ^ [ day of March 2006. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
BY: VjdZy • 
Jeffrey J. Hunt j 
David C. Reymannt 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counter-
claimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. 
d/b/a American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z\ day of March 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on 
the following: 
Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMOK£ SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DavM C. Reymann f 
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Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855) 
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
58-105(l)(a) 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
2?l/D6 U0$[ Deputy 
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BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC, a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC, a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt Regarding Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's written Ruling Re: 
Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent 
Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the 
"Ruling") and subsequent Order Granting Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (the "Order"). The Ruling and Order are incorporated herein by this reference. 
This Order and Judgment determines the amount of costs and reasonable attorneys fees to be 
awarded to the Citizen. 
The Court, having considered the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials 
submitted by the parties, being frilly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, 
hereby ORDERS as follows: 
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1. The Court finds that the attorneys fees and costs detailed in the Affidavit of Mr. Hunt 
were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-captioned case 
for all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and are properly recoverable under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). 
2. The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor 
of the Citizen in the amount of $15iS>jfr33*SL> This amount represents $155,1^3^^1 reasonably 
incurred attorneys fees and $! O in costs incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-
captioned matter from April 30, 2001 through the end of September 2005, less the amount of 
attorneys fees and costs already awarded to the Citizen by prior Order and Judgment. 
3. With respect to the prior awards, on or about August 12,2004, this Court entered an 
Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the 
"Section 1988 Order"), which awarded the Citizen attorneys fees in the amount of $13,310.83 and 
costs in the amount of $383.11. On August 12, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court also entered an Order and Judgment Regarding Award of Costs and 
Necessary Disbursements to the Citizen (the "Costs Order"), as the prevailing party under Rule 
54(d). The Costs Order awarded the Citizen costs in the amount of $6,386.22. Collectively, the 
Section 1988 Order and the Costs Order are referred to herein as the "Prior Judgments". The 
amounts already awarded under the Prior Judgments have been deducted from the Citizen's present 
request and are not duplicative with this judgment. 
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4. All amounts awarded hereunder, as with the Prior Judgments entered by the Court, 
shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date of entry. 
5. The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred after September 2005 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall 
be awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the 
Citizen's counsel. 
DATED this j f l ^ d a y o f ^ f e & f 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon/Fred D. Howard 
Fourth District Court Judg J | 
£&&A?AJl£fi-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of October 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served, via hand-delivery, on the 
following: 
Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
V3TJ 




Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. (5855) 
David C. Reymann, Esq. (8495) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. d/b/a American 
Fork Citizen New Utah! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation; TED BARRATT, an individual; 
KEVIN BENNETT, an individual; TERRY 
FOX, an individual; DON HAMPTON, an 
individual; TOM HUNTER, an individual; 
RICKY STORRS, an individual; CARL 
WANLASS, an individual; and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT REGARDING 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) 
Civil No. 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt 
Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's Order 
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-
105(1 )(a), dated March 29,2006. The Court, having considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit 
of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. For all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and the other submissions by 
the parties, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees detailed in the Second Supplemental Affidavit of 
Mr. Hunt were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-
captioned case from October 2005 through the end of March 2006, and are properly recoverable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). 
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2. The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor 
of the Citizen in the amount of $14,380.00. 
3. All amounts awarded hereunder, as with all prior judgments entered by the Court 
against Plaintiffs, shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date 
of entry. 
4. The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred after March 2006 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall be 
awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the 
Citizen's counsel. 
DATED this ^ day of fllOA/JL 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given that 
on April 27,2006 the Court herein entered its Supplemental Order and Judgment Regarding Award 
of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). A true and correct copy of 
this Order and Judgment is attached hereto. 
DATED this \_ day of May 2006. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
By: 
Jeffrey J. Hunt 
David C. Reymann V 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counter-
claimants Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. 
d/b/a American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
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BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Hunt 
Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees, which was submitted in connection with this Court's Order 
and Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-
105(l)(a), dated March 29,2006. The Court, having considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit 
of Mr. Hunt and the other pertinent materials submitted by the parties, being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. For all of the reasons specified in Mr. Hunt's Affidavit and the other submissions by 
the parties, the Court finds that the attorneys' fees detailed in the Second Supplemental Affidavit of 
Mr. Hunt were reasonably and necessarily incurred by the Citizen in connection with the above-
captioned case from October 2005 through the end of March 2006, and are properly recoverable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(l)(a). 
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2. The Court hereby enters judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in favor 
of the Citizen in the amount of $14,380.00. 
3. All amounts awarded hereunder, as with all prior judgments entered by the Court 
against Plaintiffs, shall bear post-judgment interest at the statutorily applicable rate as of their date 
of entry. 
4. The Citizen is further entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
incurred after March 2006 in connection with the above-captioned matter. Such amounts shall be 
awarded by supplemental judgment(s) upon submission of supplemental affidavit(s) from the 
Citizen's counsel. 
DATED this ^ day of JhOA/JL 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of April 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT REGARDING AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105(l)(a) was served, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Randall K Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
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" NONPARTISAN Ci llZENS GROUP INFORMATION BULLETIN 
A 1999 ELECTION QUESTION: CAN TWO CITY EMPLOYEES 
SEEK POLITICAL OFFICE? FACTS LISTED BELOW.. . . 
••CANDIDATE RICKY STORRS** 
STORRS FACT #1: Candidate Stons is a City employee functioning under the "Exempt 
Personnel Policies and Procedures" of the City. (See City Ordinance No. 92-05-20) 
STORRS FACT #2: As a City EMT Ambulance Employee, Candidate Storrs, by City 
Personnel Policy, is prohibited from holding political office while employed by the City. 
(See City Ordinance #95-05-21) 
STORRS FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Storrs has been employed by the City for 
several years. The public record indicates that Candidate Storrs failed to go on leave 
without pay from his City employment, while seeking election to political office. (See City 
Ordinance #92-05-21) 
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Storrs to go on leave without 
pay from his City employment create a special privilege for himself while he is seeking 
election to political office, and if elected, will he give up his employment with the City 
during the term of his political office? 
**CANDIDATE TOM HUNTER** 
HUNTER FACT #1: Candidate Hunter is employed by the City as a health insurance 
consultant functioning under the "Exempt Personnel Policies and Procedures" of the City. 
(See City Ordinance #92-05-20) 
HUNTER FACT #2: As a health insurance consultant, Candidate Hunter, by City 
Personnel Policy, is prohibited from holding political office while employed by the City. 
(See City Ordinance #92-05-21) 
HUNTER FINDINGS OF FACT: Candidate Hunter has been employed by the City 
since 1997. The public record indicates that Candidate Hunter failed to go on leave 
without pay from his City employment, while seeking election to political office. (See City 
Ordinance #92-05-21) 
A VOTER'S QUESTION: Will the failure of Candidate Hunter to go on leave without 
pay from his City employment create a. special privilege for himself while he is seeking 
election to political office and if elected, will he give up his employment with the City 













New Utah! l 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
OcSober28, 1999 Volume 21 No. 43 
A/ew Utah! offers apology to Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs for 
campaign flyer 
Urgent Election Notice! 
To: All American Fork Residents 
From: Publisher Brett Bezzant, American Fork Citizen New Utah! 
Correction and Apology to American Fork City Council 
Candidate Tom Hunter 
The Oct. 27th issue of \be American Fork Citizen New Utah! and New Utah! 
Shopper carried a political advertisement that ran as a preprinted flyer, paid and 
produced by William T. (Bill) Jacob and others involved in a "Nonpartisan 
Citizens Group." 
In fairness to Mr. Hunter and his candidacy, New Utah! apologizes for distributing 
this flyer without giving Mr. Hunter the opportunity to respond to what we believe 
is false and misleading information regarding his service to American Fork City. 
Mr. Hunter is not and never has been employed by American Fork City. Neither 
has he received any employee compensation nor any other employee benefit from 
American Fork City. However, Mr. Hunter does own Hunter & Associates 
Insurance and his firm was selected in 1997 to act as an independent insurance 
broker on the employee benefits package for American Fork City. His firm 
provides this same kind of service for many other employers. 
Since this client/agent relationship with American Fork City is a potential conflict 
of interest, Mr. Hunter intends, if elected, to file a letter with the Mayor clearly 
identifying the potential conflict and stating that he will abstain from voting on 
any issue that involves his pre- existing interest in the employee benefits package. 
Contrary to what Mr. Jacob's flyer implied, Mr. Hunter is, to the best of our 
knowledge, a qualified and eligible city council candidate and his candidacy has 
not, in any way, violated the policies or procedures of American Fork City. 
We also apologize to City Councilman Rick Storrs 
The same flyer also questioned the candidacy of Rick Storrs, citing a city 
personnel ordinance that does not even apply to Mr. Stores part-time, volunteer 
employment as a city EMT. The precedent for his eligibility as a city councilman 
and as an incumbent candidate have been well established in at least two other 
elections. We apologize to Mr. Storrs for distributing misleading information that 
would bring his candidacy in question. 
BEZ-2609 
nup.//www.newuiim.com/**!;>?.mm 
Comments on the flyer 
Mr Jacob's flyer is falsely labeled as a "nonpartisan" group. Since American Fork 
no onger has pohucal parties, there is no such thing as a "nonpartisan" Z p 
Unfortunately this flyer is a classic example of negative campaigning intended to 
hurt one candidate in order to favor another. We believe it hunsThe !ZTorocess 
^gain, we apologize to Candidates Hunter and Storrs for distributing this ' 
misinformation. 
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TO STRIKE INADMISSIBLE 
PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVITS OF 
DAVID AAGARD, R. BRENT 
STEPHENS, RANDALL K. 
SPENCER, AND WILLIAM T. 
JACOB and MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case # 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Counterclaimants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible 
Portions of Affidavits of David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. 
Jacob and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the file and being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following ruling. 
RULING 
Defendants and Counterclaimants Brett Bezzant andNewtah, Inc. d/b/a The American Fork 
Citizen New Utah! (collectively, the "Citizen") filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
October 19,2004. Plaintiffs submitted their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on February 17, 2005. Defendants replied on March 18, 2005 and 
submitted a Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits that same day. In addition, 
Defendants filed a Request to Submit the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on 
March 18,2005. On April 19,2005, after all parties had made their submissions in conjunction with 
the Motion to Strike, Defendants filed a Request to Submit the Motion to Strike with the Court. A 
hearing date was set for September 13, 2005 for the parties to make arguments on both pending 
motions. 
In their Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits, Defendants assert that the 
statements set forth in the affidavits or portions thereof submitted by Plaintiffs' current and former 
lawyers in the case constitute inadmissible argument, opinions, legal conclusions, and/or hearsay, 
and/or lack foundation or personal knowledge. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides the following guidance as to the acceptable form of affidavits in a summary judgment 
matter: 
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Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. 
After reviewing the substance of the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, the Court finds 
that the affidavits do not include any new facts, not already in the pleadings, that would be 
admissible in evidence. Rather, the assertions made in the affidavits consist of argument, 
opinions, and inadmissible legal conclusions. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of the Citizen's Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits of 
David Aagard, R. Brent Stephens, Randall K. Spencer, and William T. Jacob, the Court hereby 
strikes the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs. 
In Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that under 
Utah Code Section 78-58-105(l)(a), they are entitled to the portion of their costs and attorneys 
fees incurred in this matter that have not yet been awarded by the Court. Plaintiffs argue that 
Defendants have misinterpreted the provisions of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that a 
dismissal of a case under U.C.A. § 78-58-104 does not automatically meet the requirements of an 
award of attorneys fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. Section 78-58-105 provides the following: 
(1) A defendant in an action involving public participation in the process 
of government may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim to 
recover: 
(a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration that the 
action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced 
or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported 
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by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and 
(b) other compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the 
action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced 
or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing , or otherwise 
maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105. 
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' argument that a dismissal under U.C.A. § 78-58-104 
does not automatically lead to an award of attorney's fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. In order 
for a party to prevail in a counterclaim for an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees under 
U.C.A. § 78-58-105, the party must demonstrate (1) that the Anti-SLAPP statute is applicable to 
the action, (2) that the other party's claims lack factual and legal merit, and (3) that the action is 
not supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law. The Court can conceive of a situation where a plaintiffs claims would be dismissed under 
section 104 of Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute, but would not result in an award of costs and 
attorney's fees under section 105. For example, in a case of first impression where the law is 
unsettled or unclear, the existing law may or may not sustain a cause of action given a certain 
factual setting. Such a case would have the potential to bring about changes in the law. The 
Court finds, however, that Jacob's present action is not such a case. 
First, the Court finds that Utah's Anti-SLAPP statute does apply to this case. During 
the motion hearing, Plaintiffs asserted a new argument, not included in Plaintiffs' pleadings, that 
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the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the case at bar given the statutory definition of the 
"process of government." Section 78-58-102 of the Utah Code defines the "process of 
government" as "the mechanisms and procedures by which the legislative and executive branches 
of government make decisions, including the exercise by a citizen of the right to influence those 
decisions under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Plaintiffs argued that election 
campaign events do not amount to the process of government. The Court finds this reasoning 
unpersuasive in light of the facts of this case. As Defendants asserted in response to Plaintiffs' 
argument, the editorial that Defendants published dealt directly with the qualifications of Mr. 
Hunter and Mr. Storrs to have their names included on the ballot for positions on the City 
Council. The editorial was not just directed to the citizens of American Fork, but also to those in 
the city's executive and legislative positions who had the power to disqualify the candidates. 
Judge Davis, in his Ruling of April 2, 2004, also determined that the Anti-SLAPP statute is 
applicable to this case. The Court is persuaded, in accordance with Judge Davis's ruling, that 
this action involved public participation in the process of government. 
Second, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiffs' claims 
lacked factual and legal merit. The Court is persuaded that the reasoning contained in Judge 
Davis' Ruling is sufficient to support Defendants' burden of proof that Plaintiffs' action was 
commenced or continued without the necessary substantial basis in fact and law. In his Ruling, 
Judge Davis pointed to four main defects in Plaintiffs' case that led him to determine that Jacob's 
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claims lacked legal merit: (1) the Citizen's Editorial did not convey defamatory meaning as a 
matter of law; (2) the Editorial was protected by Utah's public interest privilege; (3) the Editorial 
constituted statements of editorial opinion, not verifiable statements of fact; and (4) Plaintiffs 
failed to plead special damages, which they were required to do because they did not allege 
defamation per se. As any one of the above reasons would have been sufficient to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants have made more than a sufficient demonstration, in accordance 
with U.C.A. § 78-58-105(l)(a), that Plaintiffs' claims did not have a substantial basis in fact and 
law. 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that a plaintiffs claim is not 
necessarily supported by a substantial basis in fact and law simply because it survives a motion 
of summary judgment. See Anderson Dev. Co. V. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 528 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(June 14, 2005). The Supreme Court reasoned, "Because dismissal of a claim based on either a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgement denies the nonmoving party of the right to 
litigate his claim on the merits, the threshold for surviving such a motion is relatively low." Id. 
at If 49. In this case, Plaintiffs' claims were so deficient that they did not even pass the 
"relatively low" threshold for surviving a motion for summary judgment. 
Third, the Court finds that Plaintiffs action is not supported by a substantial argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In a review of Plaintiffs' pleadings, 
especially Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment, the Court fails to find an argument that the law of defamation is deficient and that the 
facts of Plaintiffs' case are so unique as to bring about an extension, modification, or reversal of 
defamation law as it currently stands. To the contrary, all of Plaintiffs' attempts are to promote 
their causes of action under existing law. They do not show how their cause of defamation is 
distinct from those already available under existing law. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs' affidavits have been stricken, the Court notes 
that the affidavits contained arguments that could have been made in Plaintiffs' pleadings or at 
the motion hearing. However, even after a review of the arguments made in the affidavits by 
Plaintiffs' prior and current counsel, the Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff has marshaled 
substantial arguments for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. For example, 
in paragraph 4 of David Aagard's affidavit, Aagard argues that the case, Mast v. Over son, 971 
P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), was distinguishable from Jacob's facts. Aagard's reasoning is an 
attempt to simply support his assertion that Jacob had a viable claim, not an attempt to show that 
Mast is bad law that should be reversed. 
Judge Davis was not faced with a case of first impression or claims that were grounded 
in areas of law that have not matured. The law of defamation that Judge Davis applied is well 
grounded, clear, well-reasoned, and has been established over the course of many years. The 
application of the law in this matter was thus predictable. In light of the settled nature of 
defamation law and the lack of any illustration in Plaintiffs' pleadings that defamation law is 
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deficient and should be altered, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' action is not supported by a 
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
Plaintiffs contend that U.C.A. § 78-58-105 requires that a party's conduct be such that 
the claims are so lacking in merit that they do not even comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court is not persuaded that the requirements for Rule 11 sanctions must be 
met for an award of costs and attorney's fees under U.C.A. § 78-58-105. Section 78-58-105 does 
not include any provision that requires a notice to be served upon a SLAPP plaintiff in order for 
the defendant to recover costs and attorney's fees. The plain language of the statute only requires 
that the defendant demonstrate that the action involved public participation in the process of 
government and that it was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law 
and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law. The Court finds that Defendants have met this burden. 
The Utah Supreme Court also made an important clarification relating to U.C.A. § 78-
58-105 that, to avoid an improper retroactive application of Section 105, a plaintiff is only 
entitled to recover fees, costs, and damages incurred from the date of enactment of the Anti-
SLAPP Statute-April 30, 2001. See Anderson, 2005 UT at ]48. The Defendants have 
appropriately modified their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to request only the attorney's 
fees and costs they have incurred since April 30, 2001. 
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For the above reasons, this Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and the relief requested. Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an 
order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 1*5^ 5 day of September, 2005. 
Page 9 of 10 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the / £ day of 
September, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit: 
by U.S. first class mail 
Counsel for Plaintiffs: 
Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Defendants: 
Jeffrey J. Hunt 
David C. Reymann 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4jJK 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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New Utah! 
More LOCAL news than any other source! 
www.newu tah .com 
59 West Main, P.O. Box 7S American Fork, Utah 84003-0007 Telephone: (801) 756-7669 FAX: (801) 756-5274 
F V ^ - ^ 
December 9, 1999 \0 [ K 0 D 
William T. Jacob 
1100 North 100 East 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Dear Bill: 
In the spirit of trying to arrive at some kind of mutual understanding, I'll do my best to 
answer your questions. 
Q]. For what purpose did I disclose your identity as the individual who paid and 
produced the "Non-partisan Citizens Group'1 Storrs/Hunter advertisement? 
Al. There are many federal, state, and, in some cases, municipal statutes governing 
campaign disclosures. Some of them specifically require the publication of the names of those 
persons or officers responsible for the advertisement. As far as 1 know American Fork City does 
not currently have a campaign disclosure ordinance that would apply to the Non-partisan Citizen 
Group. However, Salt Lake County, for example requires that any person or association of 
persons who expend more than S250 on an issue campaign, such as an initiative, referendum, or 
bond issue establish a campaign committee and report all contributions and expenditures. There 
is, however, a state statute that applies in this case (see answer to Q2). 
The governing principle and the intent of these laws seems to be that government 
business, including elections, should be as open as possible and that voters have a right to 
"follow the money"-- to know who is trying to buy influence through the means of paid political 
advertising. 
Following this principle and in fairness to the two candidates mentioned in your 
advertisement, I corrected what was lacking in your preprinted flyer— the name of at least one 
responsible person. Before publishing this correction (the preparations for which had to be 
completed within less than two days), I attempted to reach you at your home telephone 
specifically to see if you would tell me who else should be listed as members or officers of the 
"Non-partisan Citizens Group." 
I also considered naming you as the responsible party for the advertisement opposing the 
bond as well, but decided not to mix the issues. Furthermore, the bond advertisement was not a 
personal attack as the Hunter/Storrs advertisement seemed to be. (see the answer to question Q7) 
Q2. On what basis did I conclude that I could disclose your identity without your 
NEWT AH 0049 
DEF-0049 
permission? 
A2. Utah Code Section 20A-11-901 (1) (a) (iii) 
Based on my understanding of the above, it never occurred to me to ask your permission. 
I also recall that you told me something about how you were placing the ads because, unlike 
others, you were accustomed to "taking the heat" for such things. You were the only person we 
dealt with, i.e., you inquired about rates and distribution; you delivered the flyers; and you paid 
for the advertisement with a check drawn on your personal account. Based on the above state 
statute, Tom Hunter (and anyone else) has a legal right to know not only your name, but probably 
the names of other members of the "Non-partisan Citizens Group." (I hope you realize that, 
depending on how you decide to pursue your objectives, that type of full disclosure may 
eventually become necessary.) I believe I had not only a legal, but also an ethical obligation to 
disclose your identity. 
Q3. What is New Utah's policy as to the disclosure of the identity of the purchasers of 
political advertisements? 
A3. We have no written policy, but our practice has been and will continue to be to tell all 
that we know to anyone who asks about paid political advertising. If anything, we have required 
too little public disclosure. 
On a personal note and based on our "off the record" discussion, I sympathize with any 
member of your group who fears some kind of retaliation. To be perfectly honest, I was surprised 
that you were the least bit concerned about my disclosure of your identity. It never occurred to 
me that you wanted to remain anonymous. As far as protecting our news sources, we could only 
promise such protection in extreme situations on a case by case basis. And, of course, this would 
apply only to a specific news story or series of stories on the same subject. It could never be 
applied to political advertising. 
Q4. What events led to New Utah's publication of its "Correction and Apology?" 
A4. Since you brought in the preprinted flyers to our Advertising Manager, Tom 
Hollingsworth, after our normal deadline on Tuesday, Oct. 26, he loaded them directly on our 
truck. I didn't even see the flyer in question until about 4:00 p.m.— one hour before our press 
deadline. When I saw the flyer, my initial reaction was disgust. It implied to me that Tom Hunter 
was intentionally hiding his "employment" with the city in order to gain some personal 
advantage as a city councilman. By so implying it seemed to attack his character and integrity. I 
discussed with Marc Haddock, our managing editor, the possibility of publishing some 
disclaimer in the newspaper, but he felt American Fork City Editor Barbara Christiansen's 
personal column about Rick Storrs sufficiently addressed the issue and we were both reluctant 
about taking time we did not have to re-make pages before our press deadline. 
Wednesday morning I received an angry message from Tom Hunter. He wanted to know 
who paid for the flyer and threatened to sue whomever that was as well as the newspaper. He 
also threatened to cancel his business advertising with the newspaper. He was, understandably, 
upset. I'm sure he believed he was acting in good faith regarding his candidacy and client/agent 
relationship with American Fork City. He, too, perceived the flyer as an attack on his character. I 
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called him back and told him you were the only person we dealt with That led to his phone 
conversation with you 
In my conversation with Tom Hunter, I told him how I felt about the flyer He lamented 
the fact that our next issue would be Nov 3rd and that we apparently could not respond to the 
flyer prior to the election I told him that was not necessarily true and offered to deliver my own 
response prior to the election I asked him to write down what he would like me to publish He 
sent me a FAX labeled "retraction" and said it had been approved by his attorney Since the flyer 
was a paid advertisement, I did not consider my response a retraction nor was I intimidated by his 
threat to sue the newspaper Although I used some of what Tom Hunter wanted me 10 say, the 
response was my own Howe\er, I did receive his verbal approval of the wording pi lor to its 
publication 
In retrospect, my response was partly an emotional one I was, in effect, defending a 
friend whose character had been maligned Tom Hunter is not only a valued business client of the 
newspaper, he is also my insurance agent and friend 
Since the "Non-partisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" also mentioned Rick 
Storrs, I decided to mention the question posed about his candidacy as well I called Mr Storrs 
and he told me the city personnel ordinance cited did not apply to him Gi\en his curicni yeais of 
service on the city council and his not-so recent mayoial candidacy, I took that information as an 
established precedent that he could continue to serve the city as an EMT Mr Storrs did not 
suggest any other wording, but I did FAX a copy of my response to him and leceived his verbal 
approval as well 
In addition to Hunter and Storrs, 1 also discussed my response with Managing Editoi 
Marc Haddock (Barbara Christiansen was out of town at the time ) The Correction and 
Apology" was then delivered just as the newspaper was distributed to American Fork residents, 
some by mail and some by our newspaper carriers 
Q5 Who provided information to New Utah upon which it based its conclusion that the 
Non-partisan Citizens Group's political advertisement was false and misleading7 
A5 Tom Hunter, Rick Storrs and William T Jacob 
Q6 What were the facts upon which New Utah relied m concluding that the Non-partisan 
Citizens Group's political advertisement was false and misleading 
A6 Here we differ as to what is fact and what is opinion I relied on the fact that Tom 
Hunter's purported designation as an "employee" is debatable and subject to legal interpretation 
Such designation is not a foregone conclusion and has not been proven in court If his 
"employment" were a simple fact, it would not require a one page analysis of the words used in 
the city ordinance In item 2 of your analysis, for example, an "employee" is defined as one 
whose employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee m the material details 
of how the work is to be performed In my experience this typically means the control of where 
and when the employee works, which obviously does not apply to Mr Hunter Furthermore, the 
city ordinance is very explicit about other positions If the author of this ordinance had wanted it 
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to apply to "agents" or "insurance agents," don't you think those words would have been 
included? Given the same ordinance, I believe a strong case could be made that Mr. Hunter is 
NOT, by definition, an "employee"- exempt or otherwise. 
The statement is false because the city ordinance does not make Tom Hunter an 
"employee." The ordinance does not use the words "agent" or "insurance agent," but even if 
those terms could, by legal authority, be construed to mean "consultant," which is doubtful. Such 
semantic maneuvering still does not make Tom Hunter a city employee in any sense of the word. 
The ordinance, in this case, merely restricts the political activity of city employees AND others, 
such as attorneys, consultants, volunteers, etc. However, the ordinance does not define attorneys, 
consultants, volunteers, etc. as "employees." The IRS has a complicated set of rules that 
distinguishes employees from independent contractors. By those rules, Tom Hunter is not, by any 
stretch of the imagination, an employee. By what the term "employee" would mean to virtually 
all of the audience for the Storrs/Hunter advertisement, Tom Hunter is not an employee. 
Q7. What was New Utah's factual basis for concluding that the Non-partisan Citizen's 
Group's political advertisement was "negative campaigning" and "hurts the entire process"? 
A7. Again, we differ as to what is fact and what is opinion. However, by attempting to 
mislead the residents of American Fork by stating that Tom Hunter was an employee of 
American Fork City, or at least that such "employment" was beyond any doubt, the political 
advertisement implied that Mr. Hunter was lacking in personal integrity and could not be trusted 
to execute his public office because he would be creating his own "special privileges." Since the 
advertisement was placed in the last New Utah! issue prior to the election, with no chance for 
Mr. Hunter to respond in the same newspaper and prior to the election, it was apparently 
intended to convince voters to vote for someone other than Mr. Hunter. 
I believe that both Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs ran for public office with a good faith 
presumption that they are in compliance with all city ordinances and personnel policies. The 
political advertisement was negative because it cast Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs in a negative 
light. It hurts our local political process because such negative attacks on a candidate's character, 
whether implied or explicit, discourage other potential candidates from running for local office. 
Q8. Was New Utah's "correction and apology" publication intended to represent the 
responses of Mr. Hunter and Mr. Storrs to the Non-partisan Citizens Group's political 
advertisement? 
A8. No. 
For what it's worth, I think the Non-partisan Citizens Group could have accomplished the 
same thing without expecting the reader to accept your conclusions without reservation. For 
example, it could have said, "According to our studied analysis of city ordinances arfd personnel 
policies, we believe candidate Tom Hunter qualifies as an "employee" and, as such, should go on 
leave without pay while seeking election to political office or give up his employment with the 
city during his term of office." 
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Such wording probably would have fostered more cooperation rather than hostility. 
I still don't understand where you're going with this or what more you expect of me. We 
likely will never agree on this issue, but I think we're both trying to do what is in the city's best 
interest. I sincerely hope you will accept that so we can move on to more important things. 
Instead of fighting each other, perhaps we should find some mutually acceptable way of 
improving things at City Hall. 
Brett Bezzarft 




Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 426-8200 
Fax No.: (801)426-8208 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual, AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID AAGARD 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Count erclaimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Case No. 000403530 
JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, David Aagard, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. At all times relevant herein I was a licensed attorney representing William T. Jacob 
("Jacob"). 
2. On or about October 26, 2000,1 filed the initial complaint herein setting forth a claim for 
libel. Such complaint had as its basis an October 28, 1999 "election notice" by defendant 
Bezzant asserting Jacob to be the author of an earlier anonymous bulletin which Bezzant 
declared to be false, misleading, misinformation and negative campaigning. 
3. Based on my many years (more than 15) of representing Jacob, during which I met and 
communicated with some of his partners, associates, employees, customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and fellow citizens, I had formed an opinion of Jacob's reputation. I considered 
this opinion in assessing the merit of Jacob's claim. At the time of Bezzant's notice, my 
opinion was that Jacob was a longtime resident of American Fork with a reputation as a 
prominent businessman, religious leader, and citizen. This reputation included a commitment 
to integrity, honesty, and service. It appeared clear to me that Bezzant's notice injured and 
disparaged Jacob's reputation. 
4. I reviewed some of Utah libel case law, including the case of Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Though the Mast case set a high threshold for libel in the political 
arena, I believed it to be distinguishable from Jacob's facts. In the Mast case, the parties 
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traded insults and name calling in mutual political combat. The Court found the insults not 
to be defamatory, at least in part, because the public generally expects such political verbal 
combat to be exaggerated. In Jacob's case, there was no mutual political combat. Jacob's 
anonymous bulletin questioned Storrs's and Hunter's eligibility to hold public office. Such 
anonymous bulletin was neither directed to, nor had as its subject, Bezzant. Bezzant's notice 
came, not from a mutual combatant, but from the editor of the local newspaper, an 
unprovoked local authority. This distinguishing fact justified, in my mind, giving Bezzant's 
disparaging remarks their literal defamatory meaning. 
5. I also considered whether Bezzant's disparaging remarks should be protected as editorial 
opinion. Because Jacob's anonymous bulletin limited itself to the technical question of 
Storrs's and Hunter's eligibility for public office, the scope of an opposing editorial opinion 
by a newspaper should have been limited to that subject. Bezzant's naming Jacob as the 
author and his characterization of the anonymous bulletin as false, misleading, 
misinformation and negative campaigning was unnecessary and beyond editorial opinion on 
the subject of eligibility. I believed such excess by Bezzant evidenced an intention to injure 
Jacob personally. 
6. Because Jacob's damages were not easily quantifiable and were continuing to accrue, I did 
not specify them in the initial complaint. As they accumulated and became more measurable 
over time, I expected to specify them in discovery, in an amended complaint, or in trial. 
7. At the time of filing the initial complaint, I believed Jacob's libel claim had a substantial 
basis in fact and in case law. 
8. I never, on behalf of Jacob or otherwise, acted to punish Bezzant for exercising his first 
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amendment rights. My purpose was to repair Jacob's damaged reputation and to determine 
Bezzant's motivation for disparaging Jacob. I believe consideration of my actions evidence 
an attempt to accomplish this purpose with a minimum of expense to Jacob and Bezzant. I 
did not file the complaint until the eve of the statute of limitations in order to allow Jacob the 
maximum amount of time to meet and communicate with Bezzant in an effort to settle. After 
Mr. Hunt's appearance as Bezzant's attorney, I met with Mr. Hunt and proposed a stay of 
prosecution of the case in order to explore settlement. I also informed Mr. Hunt of my 
deteriorating health and my intention to withdraw if settlement was not successful. Over the 
following approximate three months I proposed and discussed a number of formats for 
settlement with Mr. Hunt. I believe that progress was being made and settlement was possible 
when Mr. Hunt unilaterally terminated the stay and demanded discovery. I then withdrew as 
Jacob's counsel. 
Dated this /Y^day of February, 2005. 
David (Aagard 
Affiant 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this / y r/* day of February, 2005 
i & Notary Public JANEANE JACOB 1100 North 100 East American Fork, UT 84003 
My Commission Expires 
November 10,2007 
State of Utah 
Notary^rublic 
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Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 426-8200 
Fax No.: (801) 426-8208 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. BRENT STEPHENS 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual, 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWT AH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Case No. 000403530 
JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, R. Brent Stephens, after being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I was contacted towards the end of October of 2004 by Mr. Spencer requesting me 
to provide an affidavit in this matter. In view of the fact that my law firm has withdrawn from 
the case pursuant to motion and order, I informed Mr. Spencer that I would provide information 
pursuant to service of a subpoena for deposition or trial. 
2. Mr. Spencer contacted me during the last week of January, 2005 and stated that 
the Court denied his request to take my deposition in connection with pending motions for 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f) and requested that I provide this affidavit in view of 
the fact that a deposition was not possible in connection with resisting the pending motions. In 
light of the fact that I have a duty to my clients in connection with this matter to avoid possible 
further prejudice to the client based on my firm's withdrawal, I have agreed to provide this 
affidavit to fulfill duties and responsibilities under the rules of professional conduct and to 
promote the fair and efficient administration of justice. 
3. I was counsel for Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter from July 9, 2001 until 
November 6, 2003 when my law firm's motion to withdraw as counsel was granted by the Court 
4. I did not represent Plaintiffs in this matter at the time the original Complaint was 
filed. Upon retention I reviewed the original Complaint and the Rule 26 (a) (1) supporting 
documents and found it to state a claim for relief and that my review of the facts supported each 
and every allegation contained therein. 
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5. I was counsel of record at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint. 
6. In my 33 years of practice, I cannot remember a single case where I engaged in a 
more exhaustive Rule 11 type investigation prior to filing the Amended Complaint. Between my 
client and myself, we relied upon volumes of supporting documents and cited facts and/or legal 
authority in support of every single paragraph in the Amended Complaint. After preparation of 
the Amended Complaint, I actually noted next to each paragraph the support for each fact and 
law asserted. 
7. I spent hours conducting research on Westlaw gathering legal support for the 
Amended Complaint and the theories of liability contained therein. 
8. Upon submitting the Amended Complaint to defense counsel, they never 
informed me that it watTanted sanctions equivalent to Rule 11 and stipulated to its filing on June 
12, 2002. Throughout the course of my representation of Mr. Jacob and the other Plaintiffs, 
Defense counsel never stated or implied that the Plaintiffs claims were so lacking in merit that 
they violated Rule 11, were otherwise without merit, or were interposed for an improper 
puipose. 
9. After the filing of the original Complaint, David Aagard, counsel previous to me, 
was required to withdraw because Defendants ended settlement negotiations, and requested 
responses to discovery. As I understand and based on a review of the correspondence, Mr. 
Aagard had previously informed defendants' counsel that if the action did not settle during those 
negotiations, he would be required to withdraw because of his health. Mr. Aagard had been 
diagnosed as having Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's Disease). 
10. On March 22, 2001, prior to Mr. Aagard's withdrawal and even prior to the filing 
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of an attorney's planning meeting report, Defendants initiated disco very by serving 
comprehensive disco very requests on Plaintiff which included detailed interrogatories and 
requests for production. Based on my experience, such conduct is not consistent with litigation 
of a complaint now alleged to be so lacking in merit to justify sanctions. 
11. After I appeared as counsel, the parties exchanged Rule 26(a) material, and at 
least five depositions were taken; subsequently, the Amended Complaint was filed on June 12, 
2002. Furthermore, the depositions revealed facts which, if believed, supported significant and 
meritorious claims regarding the conduct of American Fork city officials which violated civil 
rights of plaintiffs and others under color of law. 
12. After I filed the Amended Complaint on June 12, 2002 pursuant to stipulation of 
opposing counsel, Defendants asserted a counterclaim pursuant to U.C.A. §78-58-105 which is 
known as the "anti-SLAPP" statute, and similar to the original Answer, asserted that Plaintiffs 
claims were brought in bad faith and lacked merit among other averments. 
13. Prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint, I did submit interrogatories and 
requests for production to Defendants on or about the 25th of July, 2001. Interrogatory 8 (u) & 
(v) specifically stated: "Identify all facts in your Answer relating to or supporting your allegation: 
...(u) in the TWENTY-SIXTH DEFENSE of your Answer that 'plaintiffs5 claims are without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith' [and] (v) in the TWENTY-SEVENTH 
DEFENSE of your Answer that 'plaintiffs lawsuit is without merit and is not brought or asserted 
in good faith, but instead is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)V' In 
submitting these interrogatories, I wanted to know if the bad faith affirmative defenses were 
based on any information of which I was not aware and should further examine. Furthermore, I 
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submitted requests for production numbers 41 & 42 asking for all documents supporting the 
affirmative defenses 26 & 27 asserting bad faith lack of merit. See Answer to original 
Complaint filed on March 2, 2001; Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant submitted on July 25, 2001 
and attached as Exhibit 1 hereto. 
14. On December 10, 2001, Defendants submitted their responses to my discovery 
requests regarding their twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh affirmative defenses which assert bad 
faith and lack of merit. The defendants did not provide any facts supporting those defenses. 
The response merely referred to the conclusory allegations of the affirmative defense contained 
in their Answer and quoted the statute. Finally, Defendants stated, "Discovery is continuing 
and Newtah anticipates the discovery of additional facts supporting these defenses." No further 
facts were brought to my attention prior to the counterclaim being filed. See Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for 
Production of Documents submitted on December 10, 2001 and attached as Exhibit 2 hereto. 
15. Defendants' counterclaim pursuant to U.C.A. §78-58-105 as I understood 
it after review, never facially asserted that the claims for defamation and false light were 
"without a substantial basis in fact and law and not supported by a substantial argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." U.C.A. §78-58-105(a). 
16. On August 19, 2002,1 filed a petition to remove the matter to federal court in light 
of the pending claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, and my belief that Defendants were utilizing 
the state SLAPP statute in a manner completely unintended and unwarranted under existing law. 
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17. I detailed in the Amended Complaint plaintiffs' factually supported claim that 
Defendant Bezzant was an unwilling instrumentality of certain defendants to intentionally chill 
first and fourteenth amendment freedoms of the Plaintiffs I represent. 
18. In light of the information learned largely through the depositions in this matter, 
on October 2, 2002,1 filed a Federal class action on behalf of a number of citizens of American 
Fork against American Fork City alleging violations of civil rights of a class defined in the 
Amended Complaint. 
19. On October 10, 2002,1 moved to consolidate this case with the Federal Lawsuit 
because the cases clearly met the threshold test for consolidation under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure if both cases had remained in federal court. 
20. On January 16, 2003, Judge Ted Stewart granted Defendants' Motion to Remand 
the case back to the State Court and specifically denied Defendants' request for attorney fees 
finding that we were seeking a good faith extension of existing law regarding removal. 
21. There was significant delay in the transferring of files from the Federal Court to 
this Court. According the Court record, it was not until August 15, 2003 that the transfer 
occurred. 
22. On October 24, 2003,1 filed a Motion to Stay or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss 
this Action Without Prejudice. This motion was based upon my conclusion that the proper 
forum for the major part of the case was in federal court in that the federal claims were more 
broad than the defamation claim and the remedial relief sought affected the entire relationship 
between the governmental officials, police force and the citizens of American Fork. The relief 
sought in the federal class action would also overlap the relief being sought in the Amended 
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Complaint and I did not want the state court action to go to final judgment that could prejudice 
the class in the federal action. While the American Fork City Defendants were willing to dismiss 
this matter (and subsequently were dismissed from the case shortly after I withdrew) the Bezzant 
Defendants refused after I offered to dismiss them without prejudice. 
23. On November 6, 2003, my law firm withdrew as counsel in this matter over the 
clients' objections. I argued on behalf of the client in connection with the motion. 
22. I hereby attest that all allegations of the amended complaint were made in good 
faith 
after detailed due diligence. I have thirty three years of experience litigating cases in state and 
federal court and I do not recall a single instance of a motion ever being filed asserting bad faith 
on any submission I signed under Rule 11. 
Dated this M day of February, 2005. 
J^ . Brent Stephens 
Affiant 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this /7^day of February, 2005. 
Notary pUbiic ~" 1 N^ fa rv Public 
JANEANE JACOB ' i W L d i ^ r c t u u ( -
1100 North 100 East 
M e ? a n F 0 r k ' U T 84003 
My Commission Expires 
November 10,2007 
State of Utah 
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Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 426-8200 
Fax No.: (801)426-8208 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM T. JACOB 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual, 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Case No. 000403530 
JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD 
STATE OF UTAH: 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a citizen of American Fork City, over the age of 18, and have personal knowledge 
concerning the facts set forth herein. 
2. On October 26, 1999, pursuant to a long standing agreement of anonymity and a 
"protected source" agreement, I delivered approximately 6,500 preprinted copies of a 
"Nonpartisan Citizens Group Information Bulletin" ("Bulletin") to Tom Hollingsworth, 
advertising manager for Brett Bezzant and Newtah, Inc. ("Original Defendants"), to be 
distributed as an insert in the Citizen. I also delivered a check in the amount of $162.50 as 
advance payment in full. 
3. I am not the author the Bulletin, and my name was not listed anywhere therein. 
4. On October 28, 1999, Bezzant published an "Urgent Election Notice" on the Citizen 
worldwide web site, wherein Bezzant falsely identified me as the author of the Bulletin and 
further claimed that it contained false and misleading information and misinformation, thereby 
calling me a liar and exposing me to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The so-called "Urgent 
Election Notice" was not on the opinion page of the web site; rather, it was accessible only via an 
icon entitled, "Election 99". Bezzant also published a door knob style flyer headlined, 
"Correction and Apology to City Council Candidate Tom Hunter" which contained the same 
substantive content as the "Urgent Election Notice" (collectively, "Election Notices") and on 
October 29, 1999, it was distributed by hand-delivery and United States mail to citizens of 
American Fork. 
5. I never gave Bezzant my permission to reveal my identity in association with the 
Bulletin. Nor did Bezzant contact me prior to publication of the Election Notices to ascertain the 
truth of his allegations against me. Rather, he recklessly relied upon information from Tom 
Hunter and Ricky Storrs, and assumed facts that were not true. 
6. During the election campaign of 1999, there was very little media coverage or 
publicity regarding Tom Hunter's and Ricky Storrs's conflicts of interest caused by their exempt 
employee status with American Fork City ("City") to seek and hold political office. 
7. I have studied American Fork City ordinances that are applicable to the underlying 
dispute in this case. I am familiar with the provisions therein which expressly state that exempt 
employees are prohibited from seeking and holding political office for the American Fork City 
Council. 
8. I was present during a deposition when Ricky Storrs testified that he is classified as an 
exempt employee. I was also present when Tom Hunter, Mayor Ted Barratt, and Kevin Bennett 
testified that Tom Hunter is an employee benefit consultant to the City. Consultants to the City 
are expressly classified as exempt employees under City Ordinance #92-05-20. Tom Hunter also 
testified that he holds a pecuniary interest in the contract between the City and the insurance 
provider because he receives commissions from the insurance provider. Hunter testified that he 
was aware that no member, officer, or employee of the City shall have any interest, direct or 
indirect, in any contract or the proceeds thereof between the City and any provider. 
9. I was present during deposition testimony when Tom Hunter testified that in response 
to the Bulletin, he contacted Bezzant and demanded that Bezzant publish a preprinted 
"retraction" approved by Hunter's attorney. Otherwise, Hunter threatened Bezzant that he would 
discontinue his newspaper advertising business with the Citizen and sue both Bezzant and me. 
Furthermore, I did receive a letter from Hunter's attorney threatening to immediately take action 
and file a lawsuit against me, attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A". 
10. Prior to the Original Defendants' recent Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
Bezzants' publications that attacked me personally have been referred to only as a "retraction", 
an "Urgent Election Notice", or a "Correction and Apology", both in the original publications 
and in the subsequent answers and responses to disco very requests. They were never identified 
as "editorials", nor was the claim ever made that they were merely opinion. As such, the public 
perceived them as formal, authoritative, factual "Election Notices", "Apologies", and 
"Corrections" in response to my alleged "misinfoiination", which is precisely how they were 
designed to be perceived. They were not identified or perceived as mere opinion and 
commentary. 
11. Even if the Election Notices had been identified and published as mere editorial 
opinion, which they were not, Bezzant's malicious personal attack and unauthorized use of my 
name as a "protected source" still exposed me to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and is still 
defamatory. 
12. Although Bezzant now claims that he felt a "civic obligation" to print the Election 
Notices, I know from my conversations with Bezzant that what he really felt was fear that at least 
Tom Hunter would sue him and discontinue advertising in the Citizen. Bezzant told me that he 
had to make a choice of being sued by Hunter or being sued by me. Bezzant also said that 
Hunter was a valued business client of the Citizen, as well as his insurance agent and friend. 
13. Moreover, contrary to Bezzant's recent claim made in hindsight that the content of 
the Election Notices reflected only his opinion, Bezzant admits that he in fact published the 
Election Notices only upon the review and express approval of Tom Hunter and Ricky Storrs. 
14. My family and I were very upset and embarrassed when Bezzant publicly and falsely 
accused me of printing false and misleading misinformation and of being a liar. Both my 
personal and professional reputation have been damaged as a result of the publication of the 
Election Notices, which were designed as an artifice to single me out and expose me to public 
hatred, contempt, and ridicule. 
15. I highly value my constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the press, and my 
right to privacy. I also cherish the rights of all concerned citizens to be actively involved in and 
contribute to their communities. I have no desire to preclude anyone else from exercising these 
same rights or from participating in their communities within appropriate constitutional 
parameters. 
16. However, I do not believe that citizens who speak out on community issues should be 
personally attacked and falsely labeled a liar for doing so, particularly at the behest of public 
officials/candidates and via malicious, false and defamatory publications that are mis-perceived 
as authoritative and objective fact, and thus are well beyond the constitutional parameters of fair 
comment. 
17. I filed this action with no desire or motivation to chill or inhibit others' constitutional 
rights, which rights I value. Rather, I filed this action because I was personally, publicly and 
unjustifiably attacked in an egregious and malicious manner designed to single me out and 
expose me to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. The harm that I have suffered as a result is 
real and not frivolous. Furthermore, there obviously has been no chilling effect caused by the 
filing of my Complaint as Original Defendants continue to publish critical and libelous 
statements about me and my associates. See, ''American Fork May Want to Consider . . ." by 
Dave Robinson, American Fork Citizen, October 23, 2003, attached as EXHIBIT CCB". 
18.1 have made numerous good-faith, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to resolve my dispute 
with Bezzant in a fair and reasonable manner and without court intervention. However, based 
upon my personal knowledge of the facts in this case, I know that Bezzant has colluded with and 
permitted himself to be manipulated by public officials in their collective efforts to punish me for 
my community involvement as a citizen of American Fork. Further and contrary to his claims, 
Bezzant has never requested that I dismiss this action. Indeed, I have read Bezzant's Affidavit 
and most of his allegations are not true. 
19. Based upon my personal knowledge of the facts underlying this action, my role as a 
concerned citizen of American Fork, my participation in the distribution of the anonymous 
Bulletin, and my communications with Bezzant subsequent to publication of the Election 
Notices, I believe that the primary purpose of the Election Notices, the Counterclaim and the 
consequent Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings/ Summary Judgment is to prevent, interfere 
with, and/or to chill my participation and the participation of other concerned citizens in the 
process of government, including the right to engage in the legitimate public debate regarding 
various community issues in American Fork City. 
20. As a result of Bezzant's malicious and defamatory publication and subsequent and 
related conduct, including but not limited to his frivolous and groundless anti-SLAPP 
Counterclaim and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Commercial Properties, Inc., Phillips 






Dated this (2fci ay of February, 2005. 
^Ulia^T. Jacob / ^ 
Affiant 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 1 / day of Febraary, 2005 
Notary 
My Commission Expires: Q^yjO I / 0 ~"7 
" Public ^ 
^/ 
:•*£ f.^-^f.v-roO/' 
Randall K. Spencer (6992) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 426-8200 
Fax No.: (801)426-8208 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF RANDALL K. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual, SPENCER 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK Case No. 000403530 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah coiporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
JUDGE: FRED D. HOWARD 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; 
NEWTAH, INC., dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Randall K. Spencer, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am currently counsel for William T. Jacob and the other Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
defendants in the above entitled matter. 
2. I was contacted in November of 2003 by Mr. Jacob and was requested to represent him 
and the other Plaintiffs. 
3. Prior to entering an appearance, I reviewed the amended Complaint and hundreds of 
pages of documents provided to be by Mr. Jacob. 
4. I also reviewed the elements of the causes of action, and I was very satisfied that the 
claims were meritorious pursuant to a Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
standard. 
5. I subsequently signed and submitted Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment 
on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim among other pleadings. 
6. I am confident that every pleading that has been submitted in this case complies with the 
standards of Rule 11 and the essentially equivalent language of U.C.A. §78-58-105 
(2001). 
7. I have spent many hours working with my clients in this matter, and am confident that no 
improper motives have existed in the pursuit of this litigation. 
8. In preparing the Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment on the Pleadings and/or 
Summary Judgment, Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 
among other pleadings, I believed then, and still believe now that the arguments were not 
only compliant with Rule 11, but were in fact meritorious such that we should have 
prevailed at least for puiposes of the gatekeeping functions of summary dispositions. 
9. It is my further belief that Defendants' motion for sanctions of attorney fees and costs 
against me and my client for advancing this claim without substantial basis in fact and 
law and without a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law is simply wrong. 
Dated this t day of February, 2005. 
idall K. Spencer 
Affiant 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this \ 1 day of February, 2005. 
Notary Public I 0 
My Commission Expires: ' ^ / ( 3 i / Q "7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the _J [_ day of fl^r- . 2005,1 caused to be delivered a copy 
of the foregoing to the following: 
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and PHILLIPS 




B. BRETT BEZZANT, an individual, 
NEWT AH, INC, dba AMERICAN FORK 
CITIZEN NEW UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
BRETT BEZZANT, an individual; NEWTAH, 
INC, dba AMERICAN FORK CITIZEN 
NEW UTAH, a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM T. JACOB, an individual; 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, INC, a Utah 
Corporation; and PHILLIPS 
MANUFACTURING CO, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Case # 000403530 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' submission of & Motion to Reconsider 
Court }s Rulings on Summary Judgment and/or Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment 
on Defendants' Counterclaim. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby issues the following ruling. 
RULING 
The Court notes that Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider with an accompanying 
memorandum on October 7, 2005. On October 27, 2005, Defendants filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. Plaintiffs filed a Response on November 8,2005 and Defendants 
filed a Request to Submit for Decision on November 17,2005. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have 
requested a hearing on the issue of reconsideration. The Court declines to grant this request due to 
the fact that the Court is well familiar with the issues and the facts of this case. The Court has 
reviewed its notes and previous Ruling on this issue and the parties' memoranda and does not 
consider a hearing to be necessary in order to decide the issues before the Court. 
Plaintiffs assert that the Court should reconsider its Ruling of September 16,2005 because 
the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment prior to considering Plaintiffs' 
supplemental authority and that the law cited by Plaintiffs is dispositive and demonstrates that the 
anti-SLAPP Act does not apply to the facts of the present case. Defendants argue that a Motion to 
Reconsider is inappropriate and not contemplated by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants 
argue that Plaintiffs have not offered any new facts, new law, or new argument that has not already 
been exhaustively considered. 
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The Court first notes that Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Court's Rulings is inappropriate 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the simple reason that no such motion exists. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long held a motion for reconsideration to be improper. Utah State Employees 
Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1970) ("We are unaware of any such motion under our 
rules"). The Utah Supreme Court has also declared that ua motion to reconsider the final judgment 
of the district court [is] a motion which is not provided for under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and which has never been recognized as a proper motion in this state. Wisden v. Bangerter et al, 893 
P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1995). In order to prevent litigants from endlessly requesting a court to 
reverse itself, the Utah Supreme Court does not allow such a motion. In the interest of judicial 
economy and finality, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion to reconsider is not a valid 
motion. Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion for reconsideration after a summary 
judgment ruling can be considered a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. Watkins & Campbell v. 
Foa & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). In order for the motion to be granted, however, the 
movant must demonstrate that one of the requirements for a new trial are met, which are as follows: 
(1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, (2) misconduct of the jury, (3) accident or surprise, 
(4) newly discovered evidence, (5) excessive or inadequate damages, (6) insufficiency of the 
evidence, or (7) error in law. 
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Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that would satisfy any of the above requirements 
to justify the Court granting a new trial. The Court respectfully disagrees with the arguments of 
Plaintiffs in their Motion to Reconsider, which issues and arguments are the same as previously 
considered. As Defendants note in their Opposition Memorandum, the entire basis of Plaintiffs' 
reconsideration motion was discussed at oral argument and directly rejected by this Court in its 
Ruling of September 16, 2005. In a motion for a new trial, the movant cannot simply reiterate the 
same arguments that failed previously and expect the Court to rule in its favor. The Court is 
unpersuaded to change its analysis or ruling. Having reached such conclusion, the Court respectfully 
denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
Dated this day of January, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: \C ^ P f > 
$ & $ & g,f5 v 
JUDGE FRED D./OWAREgf f s ^ '-. !>\\ 
District Court J u 4 e | ^ ^ ^ | 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the t ^ day of 
to the following in the manner indicated, to wit: 
Ok^uavy 'ZooC 
by U.S. first class mail 
Counsel for Plaintiffs: 
Randall K. Spencer 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Defendants: 
Jeffrey J. Hunt 
David C. Reymann 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6, tut. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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